How severe is GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm?

GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm has a CVSS score of 7.3/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm?

GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm affects the following packages: PanelSW.Custom.WiX (NuGet). Ecosystems affected: NuGet.

How do I fix GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm?

Update PanelSW.Custom.WiX to 3.15.0-a46 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm in my NuGet dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for PanelSW.Custom.WiX, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Is GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm was published on March 25, 2024 and was last updated on December 5, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

.NET

.NET NuGet

Not in CISA KEV

HIGH severity

WiX Burn-based bundles are vulnerable to binary hijack when run as SYSTEMGHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm

HIGHFix: nirbar/wix3@99e754b

GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) vulnerability in PanelSW.Custom.WiX. A fix is available for PanelSW.Custom.WiX — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published

Mar 25, 2024

Updated

Dec 5, 2024

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Dec 5, 2024 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

.NETPanelSW.Custom.WiX

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Burn uses an unprotected C:\Windows\Temp directory to copy binaries and run them from there. This directory is not entirely protected against low privilege users.

Details

When a bundle runs as SYSTEM user, Burn uses GetTempPathW which points to an insecure directory C:\Windows\Temp to drop and load multiple binaries. Standard users can hijack the binary before it's loaded in the application resulting in elevation of privileges.

icacls c:\windows\temp

BUILTIN\Users:(CI)(S,WD,AD,X)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

Built in users(non-administrators) have special permissions to this folder and can create files and write to this directory. While they do not have explicit read permissions, there is a way they can monitor the changes to this directory using ReadDirectoryChangesW API and thus figure out randomized folder names created inside this directory as wel

PoC

PoC works against the against visual studio enterprise with update 3 installer

Reproduction steps

As a standard user, run the poc. Mount the iso and run visual studio installer as local system account. The PoC should hijack the the binaries dropped by vs installer and a child process "notepad.exe" will be running.

Impact

This is an Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability where a low privileged user can hijack binaries in an unprotected path C:\Windows\Temp to elevate to the SYSTEM user privileges.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
.NETNuGet	`PanelSW.Custom.WiX`	all versions	3.15.0-a46`dotnet add package PanelSW.Custom.WiX --version 3.15.0-a46`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for PanelSW.Custom.WiX, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update PanelSW.Custom.WiX to 3.15.0-a46 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wq88-fq4x-h2pm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Summary Burn uses an unprotected C:\Windows\Temp directory to copy binaries and run them from there. This directory is not entirely protected against low privilege users. # Details When a bundle runs as SYSTEM user, Burn uses GetTempPathW which points to an insecure directory C:\Windows\Temp to drop and load multiple binaries. Standard users can hijack the binary before it's loaded in the application resulting in elevation of privileges. ``` icacls c:\windows\temp BUILTIN\Users:(CI)(S,WD,AD,X) BUILTIN\Administrators:(F) BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(F) NT A

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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