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Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enableGHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9

MEDIUMFix: 0xJacky/nginx-ui@23d1934

GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) CWE-613 vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. A fix is available for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-84321GO-2026-6801
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs11th percentile — riskier than 11% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,415 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again.

Details

GenerateShortToken() creates an AuthToken row that contains only ShortToken and no long Token. DeleteUserTokens() removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where authToken.Token != "". This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. GetTokenUserByShortToken() checks that cache first and then loads the user by ID, so the stale short token becomes usable again if the account status is restored to true.

Relevant code paths:

PoC

This was verfied locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real token issuance, revocation, cache, and re-authentication paths.

What the executed test did:

  1. Created an enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.
  2. Called the real GenerateShortToken(user.ID) function to issue a standalone short token.
  3. Verified that the token authenticated successfully and was present in the short-token cache.
  4. Disabled the user and called the real DeleteUserTokens(user.ID) function.
  5. Verified that the database token rows were removed.
  6. Verified that the short-token cache entry still existed after DeleteUserTokens.
  7. Re-enabled the same user.
  8. Reused the previously deleted short token via the real GetTokenUserByShortToken() path and observed successful authentication.

Observed result from the actual local verification:

  • The database token rows were removed during revocation.
  • The short-token cache entry remained present.
  • Re-enabling the user restored successful authentication through the stale short token.

Impact

Any deployment using standalone short tokens is affected. If a short token is stolen, administrative disable/delete-token handling may not fully revoke it. Re-enabling the account within the cache lifetime restores access for the stale token to any HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIall versions1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0go get github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI@v1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again. ### Details `GenerateShortToken()` creates an `AuthToken` row that contains only `ShortToken` and no long `Token`. `DeleteUserTokens()` removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where `authToken.Token != ""`. This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` checks that ca
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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