GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm
LOWCosign considered signatures valid with expired intermediate certificates when transparency log verification is skipped
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/sigstore/cosignReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When verifying artifact signatures using a certificate, Cosign first verifies the certificate chain using the leaf certificate's "not before" timestamp and later checks expiry of the leaf certificate using either a signed timestamp provided by the Rekor transparency log or from a timestamp authority, or using the current time. The root and all issuing certificates are assumed to be valid during the leaf certificate's validity. An issuing certificate with a validity that expires before the leaf certificate will be considered valid during verification even if the provided timestamp would mean the issuing certificate should be considered expired.
Impact
No impact to users of the public Sigstore infrastructure. This may affect private deployments with customized PKIs. In practice, this is unlikely to occur as CAs should not be issuing certificates that outlive the validity of the CA and its parents.
Workarounds
Upgrade to the latest release, or verify the certificate chain out of band.
Example to Reproduce
- Root CA certificate is valid from 12pm-2pm
- Intermediate CA certificate is valid from 12:30pm-1:30pm
- Leaf certificate is valid from 1pm-3pm - Note that this is unlikely to happen in practice, as a CA shouldn't issue a certificate that would be valid after the issuing CA certificate expires
- Signature generated at 2:30pm with a signed timestamp
- During verification, the leaf certificate's not before time (1pm) is used to verify the chain - 1pm is in the validity windows for the root and intermediate CA certificates
- The timestamp's time is checked to be in the validity window of only the leaf certificate - 2:30pm is in the validity window for the leaf
- Even though the root and intermediate would be expired at 2:30pm, verification succeeds
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/cosign | all versions | 3.0.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/cosign. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/sigstore/cosign to 3.0.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wfqv-66vq-46rm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.