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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3

HIGH

SSRF Vulnerability on assetlinks_check(act_name, well_knowns)

Also known asCVE-2024-29190PYSEC-2024-257
Published
Mar 22, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk49th percentile+0.12%
0.00%0.40%0.81%1.21%0.3%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍mobsfscan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

While examining the "App Link assetlinks.json file could not be found" vulnerability detected by MobSF, we, as the Trendyol Application Security team, noticed that a GET request was sent to the "/.well-known/assetlinks.json" endpoint for all hosts written with "android:host". In the AndroidManifest.xml file.

Since MobSF does not perform any input validation when extracting the hostnames in "android:host", requests can also be sent to local hostnames. This may cause SSRF vulnerability.

Details

Example <intent-filter structure in AndroidManifest.xml:

<intent-filter android:autoVerify="true">
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:host="192.168.1.102/user/delete/1#" android:scheme="http" />
</intent-filter>

We defined it as android:host="192.168.1.102/user/delete/1#". Here, the "#" character at the end of the host prevents requests from being sent to the "/.well-known/assetlinks.json" endpoint and ensures that requests are sent to the endpoint before it.

<img width="617" alt="image" src="https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/assets/150332295/c570cb00-e947-4ad7-af80-26d46c0ad3f7">

PoC

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nbKMd2sKosbJef5Mh4DxjcHcQ8Hw0BNR/view?usp=share_link

Impact

The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImobsfscanall versions0.3.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mobsfscan. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update mobsfscan to 0.3.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary While examining the "App Link assetlinks.json file could not be found" vulnerability detected by MobSF, we, as the Trendyol Application Security team, noticed that a GET request was sent to the "/.well-known/assetlinks.json" endpoint for all hosts written with "android:host". In the AndroidManifest.xml file. Since MobSF does not perform any input validation when extracting the hostnames in "android:host", requests can also be sent to local hostnames. This may cause SSRF vulnerability. ### Details Example <intent-filter structure in AndroidManifest.xml: ``` <intent-filter android
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3: mobsfscan Server-Side Request Forgery (Hig… | O3 Security