GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh — cbor2
Fix: agronholm/cbor2#268GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh is a CWE-212 vulnerability in cbor2. A fix is available for cbor2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
CBORDecoder reuse can leak shareable values across decode calls
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
cbor2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When a CBORDecoder instance is reused across multiple decode operations, values marked with the shareable tag (28) persist in memory and can be accessed by subsequent CBOR messages using the sharedref tag (29). This allows an attacker-controlled message to read data from previously decoded messages if the decoder is reused across trust boundaries.
Details
The issue is in the decoder's handling of the shareables list, which stores values tagged with CBOR tag 28 (shareable) for later reference by tag 29 (sharedref).
When decode_from_bytes() is called or when .fp is set to a new stream, the shareables list is not cleared. This allows references to persist across separate decode operations.
The issue exists in both the C extension and the pure Python decoder.
In the C extension (source/decoder.c), the _CBORDecoder_set_fp function (line ~202) updates the file pointer but does not reset the shareables state:
static int
_CBORDecoder_set_fp(CBORDecoderObject *self, PyObject *value, void *closure)
{
// ... validation ...
tmp = self->read;
self->read = read;
Py_DECREF(tmp);
return 0;
// Missing: PyList_Clear(self->shareables) or equivalent
}
In the pure Python decoder (cbor2/_decoder.py), the fp setter similarly fails to clear self._shareables.
Similarly, decode_from_bytes() in both implementations saves and restores the read pointer but does not clear the shareables list between decodes.
The shareable/sharedref tags are defined in the CBOR value sharing extension (http://cbor.schmorp.de/value-sharing) with scope limited to a single CBOR data item, not across separate messages.
PoC
import cbor2
from io import BytesIO
# Message from trusted source containing a shareable value
msg1 = cbor2.dumps(cbor2.CBORTag(28, "secret"))
# Attacker-controlled message referencing index 0
msg2 = cbor2.dumps(cbor2.CBORTag(29, 0))
# Decoder reused across trust boundaries
decoder = cbor2.CBORDecoder(BytesIO(b''))
decoder.decode_from_bytes(msg1)
print(decoder.decode_from_bytes(msg2)) # prints "secret"
No special configuration required. Affects any application that reuses a CBORDecoder instance to decode messages from different sources.
Impact
Information disclosure. Applications that reuse a CBORDecoder across trust boundaries are vulnerable if the trusted messages use value sharing (tag 28) and an attacker can send messages containing shared references (tag 29). An attacker who can send a crafted CBOR message containing a sharedref tag can read values from previously decoded messages, potentially exposing sensitive data such as credentials, tokens, or private user data.
Related
A similar issue in the encoder could produce invalid CBOR with dangling shared references:
import cbor2
from io import BytesIO
# Create encoder with value sharing enabled
encoder = cbor2.CBOREncoder(BytesIO(), value_sharing=True)
# Persistent object that will be encoded multiple times
shared_obj = ['hello']
# First encode: array containing shared_obj twice
encoder.encode([shared_obj, shared_obj])
print(f'First encode: {encoder.fp.getvalue().hex()}')
# Output: d81c82d81c816568656c6c6fd81d01
# Second encode: just shared_obj
encoder.fp = BytesIO()
encoder.encode(shared_obj)
result = encoder.fp.getvalue()
print(f'Second encode: {result.hex()}')
# Output: d81d01 (just a shared reference to index 1!)
# Try to decode the second result as standalone CBOR
decoder = cbor2.CBORDecoder(BytesIO(result))
decoded = decoder.decode()
# FAILS: shared reference 1 not found
While primarily a correctness bug, it could cause denial of service if invalid CBOR is transmitted to downstream systems that fail to parse it, or cause silent data corruption if the dangling reference happens to resolve to an unrelated value.
It can also be considered a memory leak in both the decoder and encoder as references are held that will never be released as long as the decoder/encoder remains alive.
Suggested resolution
Add dedicated boolean flags to track when an encode/decode operation is in progress. Reset shared state only when the flag is False (top-level call). This ensures state is reset for standalone calls while preserving shared references for nested calls from hooks (which need access to the registry for cyclic structures).
Decoder (_decoding flag):
- decode(): set flag True, reset state, decode, set flag False
- decode_from_bytes(): reset state only when flag is False
Encoder (_encoding flag):
- encode(): set flag True, reset state, encode, set flag False
- encode_to_bytes(): reset state only when flag is False
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | cbor2 | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 5.8.0 | 5.8.0pip install --upgrade 'cbor2==5.8.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for cbor2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update cbor2 to 5.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability is rated Moderate for Red Hat products. The flaw in cbor2 allows information disclosure if a CBORDecoder instance is reused across trust boundaries. This could lead to an attacker-controlled message reading sensitive data from previously decoded messages. This affects Red Hat AI Inference Server,…
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-cuda-rhel9:1774351144 | RHSA-2026:5809 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/model-opt-cuda-rhel9:1774547384 | RHSA-2026:6761 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-rocm-rhel9:1775252598 | RHSA-2026:6762 |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25 | rhoai/odh-vllm-cpu-rhel9:1776259063 | RHSA-2026:10184 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wcj4-jw5j-44wh across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.