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MEDIUM severity

in-toto vulnerable to Configuration Read From Local DirectoryGHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf

MEDIUMFix: in-toto/in-toto@3a21d84

GHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.5) CWE-15 vulnerability in in-toto. A fix is available for in-toto — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2023-32076GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4xPYSEC-2023-63
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.74%0.1%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍in-toto

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The in-toto configuration is read from various directories and allows users to configure the behavior of the framework. The files are from directories following the XDG base directory specification [1]. Among the files read is .in_totorc which is a hidden file in the directory in which in-toto is run. If an attacker controls the inputs to a supply chain step, they can mask their activities by also passing in an .in_totorc file that includes the necessary exclude patterns and settings.

RC files are widely used in other systems [2] and security issues have been discovered in their implementations as well [3]. We found in our conversations with in-toto adopters that in_totorc is not their preferred way to configure in-toto. As none of the options supported in in_totorc is unique, and can be set elsewhere using API parameters or CLI arguments, we decided to drop support for in_totorc.

Other Recommendations

Sandbox functionary code as recommended in https://github.com/in-toto/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4x.

References

[1] https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-latest.html [2] https://spec.editorconfig.org/ [3] https://github.blog/2022-04-12-git-security-vulnerability-announced/

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIin-totoall versions2.0.0pip install --upgrade 'in-toto==2.0.0'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
in-totoin-toto_project
≤ 1.4.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for in-toto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update in-toto to 2.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The in-toto configuration is read from various directories and allows users to configure the behavior of the framework. The files are from directories following the XDG base directory specification [1]. Among the files read is `.in_totorc` which is a hidden file in the directory in which in-toto is run. If an attacker controls the inputs to a supply chain step, they can mask their activities by also passing in an `.in_totorc` file that includes the necessary exclude patterns and settings. RC files are widely used in other systems [2] and security issues have been discovered in the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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in-toto vulnerable to Configuration Read From Local…