GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c
DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 briefly compromised with malware
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
duckdbnpm@duckdb/node-apinpm@duckdb/node-bindingsnpmDescription
The DuckDB distribution for Node.js on npm was compromised with malware (along with several other packages). An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions. The following packages and versions are affected:
@duckdb/[email protected]@duckdb/[email protected][email protected]@duckdb/[email protected]
Note: The current release version of DuckDB is 1.3.2, with 1.4.0 expected to be released on Sept 10th, 2025 (tomorrow as of this writing). We do not plan to ever release a “legit” DuckDB 1.3.3. Users should double-check that they are not accidentally updating to those affected versions.
We have ourselves noticed this within four hours of it happening. Here’s our response:
- As an immediate response, we have deprecated the specific versions.
- We have reached out to npm support to delete the affected versions. They were so kind to do so.
- We have also re-released the node packages with higher version numbers (1.3.4/1.30.0) as a further safeguard so the latest version of the package points to a safe version
We apologize for this issue. We are reviewing our internal processes to ensure the safety of future releases.
Postmortem
On September 8th (Monday), the DuckDB maintainers received the following message from "[email protected]":
<img width="1134" height="614" alt="Screenshot 2025-09-09 at 11 07 09" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ce24798-1f5a-40b0-ac50-49035d99862b" />One of the maintainers read through this text and found it somewhat reasonable. He followed the link (now defunct) to a website hosted under the domain npmjs.help. This website contained a pixel-perfect copy of the npmjs.com website. He logged in using the duckdb_admin user and password, followed by 2FA. Again, the user profile, settings etc. were a perfect copy of the npmjs.com website including all user data. As requested by the email, he then re-set the 2FA setup.
In the background, the copycat website forwarded all actions to the actual npm website, so the 2FA was actually updated there, too. But they also added a new API token, which they then used to publish the malicious package versions. In hindsight, the fact that his browser did not auto-complete the login should have been a red flag. It's painful to spell out, but we fell for a classic phishing attack.
We again apologize for this mishap. We are reviewing our internal processes to ensure the safety of future releases. It is fortunate that we noticed this within a few hours of it happening. The DuckDBLabs team was able to set up a call at 7AM to perform an immediate response. Fortunately we were not locked out of our NPM account, which also easily could have happened. We were able to rotate passwords, tokens and API keys immediately.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | duckdb | ≥ 1.3.3&&< 1.3.4 | 1.3.4 |
| 📦npm | @duckdb/node-api | ≥ 1.3.3&&< 1.3.4-alpha.27 | 1.3.4-alpha.27 |
| 📦npm | @duckdb/node-bindings | ≥ 1.3.3&&< 1.3.4-alpha.27 | 1.3.4-alpha.27 |
| 📦npm | @duckdb/duckdb-wasm | ≥ 1.29.2&&< 1.30.0 | 1.30.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for duckdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update duckdb to 1.3.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.