Gortex: Arbitrary file write / repo-confinement escape in `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline` MCP tools → code executionGHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p
HIGHFix: zzet/gortex@5ba2f06GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/zzet/gortex. A fix is available for github.com/zzet/gortex — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/zzet/gortexReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Gortex is an MCP server exposing write_file, edit_file, and move_inline tools. resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from confinement, and the write handlers — unlike read_file / get_symbol_source — never call guardSymlinkWithinRepo. A single MCP write_file call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, outside every indexed repo root (AtomicWriteFile's MkdirAll auto-creates missing parents). Writing ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project's own SECURITY.md invariant "File-path resolution is confined to indexed repository roots"
Affected
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go (+ tools_move_inline.go), HEAD 28fa017 (v0.53.0).
CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name/Path) → CWE-94 (code execution).
Vulnerable code
internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62 resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at :793 (AtomicWriteFile, write_file) and :676 (edit_file) run with no guardSymlinkWithinRepo. The asymmetry is the bug: read_file (:940) and get_symbol_source do call guardSymlinkWithinRepo; the write path does not.
PoC (executed)
The PoC (internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go, package mcp) builds the server via the repo's own newSingleRepoServer(t) harness and invokes the real srv.handleWriteFile through the genuine mcplib.CallToolRequest shape:
=== RUN TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot
indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo
handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50
PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes "OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root"
RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -> "echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file"
VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 ("It does not write to source files")
--- PASS (go test ok)
The test asserts the handler did not return IsError and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)
Impact
write_file / edit_file are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can — startup/hook/cron files → arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property SECURITY.md promises) is broken on the write path.
Severity
High — CVSS v3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ≈ 8.x. UI:R reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file → execute on next trigger), so I:H + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower — but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.
Remediation
Apply guardSymlinkWithinRepo (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on write_file / edit_file / move_inline, identically to read_file / get_symbol_source. Confinement must cover the write path.
Dedup / freshness (re-verified live)
gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories → [] (none). gh search prs/issues for resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo / symlink / traversal / confinement → 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo are gortex-own code (not vendored). Fresh at HEAD 28fa017.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/zzet/gortex | all versions | 0.55.0go get github.com/zzet/gortex@v0.55.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/zzet/gortex, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/zzet/gortex to 0.55.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.