How severe is GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g?

GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g affects the following packages: tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery (Maven). Ecosystems affected: Maven.

How do I fix GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g?

Update tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery to 0.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g in my Maven dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Is GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g?

GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 43th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g?

GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g is classified as CWE-323 (CWE-323), Insufficient Random Values (CWE-330). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g was published on April 6, 2021 and was last updated on July 8, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout…

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs43th percentile — riskier than 43% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

☕tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session though it should be generated on per message basis which can lead to the leaking of the session key. As the actual ENR record is signed with a different key it is not possible for an attacker to alter the ENR record. Note that the node private key is not compromised, only the session key generated to communicate with an individual peer.

From discovery spec:

The number of messages which can be encrypted with a certain session key is limited because encryption of each message requires a unique nonce for AES-GCM. In addition to the keys, the session cache must also keep track of the count of outgoing messages to ensure the uniqueness of nonce values. Since the wire protocol uses 96 bit AES-GCM nonces, it is strongly recommended to generate them by encoding the current outgoing message count into the first 32 bits of the nonce and filling the remaining 64 bits with random data generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
☕Maven	`tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery`	all versions	0.4.5`tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery:0.4.5`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

discoveryconsensys

< 0.4.5

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery to 0.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session though it should be generated on per message basis which can lead to the leaking of the session key. As the actual ENR record is signed with a different key it is not possible for an attacker to alter the ENR record. Note that the node private key is not compromised, only the session key generated to communicate with an individual peer. From [discovery spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/f97b8a5b8e9589d3355ebbd9d4a58d5d1644bdf7/discv5/discv5-theory.md#session-cache): > The number of messages which can be encrypted with a

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the sessionGHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g