GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4
HIGHGHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Klever-Go KVM: Hash-array amplification in P2P resolver request handling
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/klever-io/klever-goReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataType_HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On klever-go v1.7.17, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections.
Details
Resolver antiflood logic accounts only one logical message and the compressed wire size in data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30.
Batch.Decompress() in data/batch/batch.go#L122 enforces an inflated byte cap but does not enforce a decoded repeated-field item cap. After decompression, TxResolver preallocates and iterates all decoded hashes in data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194, and TrieNodeResolver iterates the same unchecked decoded set in data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108.
Pinned references:
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/batch/batch.go#L122
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108
This appears distinct from the public CVE-2026-44697 / GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v, which covered MultiDataInterceptor compressed batch fan-in. This report concerns resolver request paths that remain reachable through real libp2p direct-send plumbing on v1.7.17.
PoC
Reproduced with:
go run auditpoc/request_batch_hash_amplification_poc.go
go test github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc -run TestRequestBatchHashAmplification_DirectSendReachability -count=1
Observed output:
request wire bytes: 442
fits direct-send limit (983040 bytes): true
tx resolver lookups: 200000
trie resolver lookups: 200000
heap delta before first tx lookup: 17.47 MiB
ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc
The E2E harness registers the victim resolver on the request topic and sends the malicious payload through SendToConnectedPeer() to prove the work amplification survives the real direct-send path.
Impact
A connected peer can convert a sub-kilobyte request into large decode-time memory pressure and synchronous CPU work on the target node. Repeated requests or several concurrent peers can degrade or exhaust validator resources, affecting node availability.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/klever-io/klever-go | all versions | 1.7.18 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/klever-io/klever-go. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/klever-io/klever-go to 1.7.18 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.