GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm
HIGHCometBFT may duplicate transactions in the mempool's data structures
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/cometbft/cometbft🐹github.com/cometbft/cometbftReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The mempool maintains two data structures to keep track of outstanding transactions: a list and a map. These two data structures are supposed to be in sync all the time in the sense that the map tracks the index (if any) of the transaction in the list.
Unfortunately, it is possible to have them out of sync. When this happens, the list may contain several copies of the same transaction. Because the map tracks a single index, it is then no longer possible to remove all the copies of the transaction from the list. This happens even if the duplicated transaction is later committed in a block. The only way to remove the transaction is by restarting the node.
These are the steps to cause the above duplication problem. Everything should happen within one height, that is no FinalizeBlock or BeginBlock ABCI calls should happen while these steps are reproduced:
- send transaction tx1 to the target full node via RPC
- send N more different transactions to the target full node, where N should be higher than the node's configured value for
cache_sizeinconfig.toml - send transaction tx1 again to the target full node
One of the copies of tx1 is now stuck in the mempool's data structures. Effectively causing a memory leak, and having that node gossiping that transaction to its peers forever.
The above problem can be repeated on and on until a sizable number of transactions are stuck in the mempool, in order to try to bring down the target node.
This problem is present in releases: v0.37.0, and v0.37.1, as well as in v0.34.28, and all previous releases of the CometBFT repo. It will be fixed in releases v0.34.29 and v0.37.2.
Patches
The PR containing the fix is here.
Workarounds
- Increasing the value of
cache_sizeinconfig.tomlmakes it very difficult to effectively attack a full node. - Not exposing the transaction submission RPC's would mitigate the probability of a successful attack, as the attacker would then have to create a modified (byzantine) full node to be able to perform the attack via p2p.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | all versions | 0.34.29 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | ≥ 0.37.0&&< 0.37.2 | 0.37.2 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cometbft/cometbft. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cometbft/cometbft to 0.34.29 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-w24w-wp77-qffm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.