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HIGH severity

phpMyFAQ Allows Unauthenticated Account Creation via WebAuthn Prepare EndpointGHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4

HIGHFix: thorsten/phpMyFAQ@f2ab673

GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-862 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-27836
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs40th percentile — riskier than 40% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.66%0.99%0.1%0.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (/api/webauthn/prepare) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled.

Details

File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php, lines 63-79

#[Route(path: 'webauthn/prepare', name: 'api.private.webauthn.prepare', methods: ['POST'])]
public function prepare(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
    $data = json_decode($request->getContent(), ...);
    $username = Filter::filterVar($data->username, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);

    if (!$this->user->getUserByLogin($username, raiseError: false)) {
        try {
            $this->user->createUser($username);
            $this->user->setStatus(status: 'active');
            $this->user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_WEB_AUTHN->value);
            $this->user->setUserData([
                'display_name' => $username,
                'email' => $username,
            ]);

The endpoint:

  1. Accepts any POST request with a JSON username field
  2. If the username doesn't exist, creates a new active user account
  3. Does NOT check if WebAuthn support is enabled (security.enableWebAuthnSupport)
  4. Does NOT check if registration is enabled (security.enableRegistration)
  5. Does NOT verify CSRF tokens
  6. Does NOT require captcha validation
  7. Has no rate limiting

PoC

# Create an account - no auth needed
curl -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"attacker_account"}'

# Mass account creation
for i in $(seq 1 1000); do
  curl -s -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{\"username\":\"spam_user_$i"}" &
done

Impact

  • Registration bypass: Accounts created even when self-registration is disabled
  • Username squatting: Reserve usernames before legitimate users
  • Database exhaustion: Create millions of fake active accounts (DoS)
  • User enumeration: Different responses for existing vs new usernames
  • Security control bypass: WebAuthn config check is bypassed entirely

All phpMyFAQ installations with the WebAuthn controller routed (default) are affected, regardless of configuration settings.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaqall versions4.0.18composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.18

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
phpmyfaqphpmyfaq
< 4.0.18
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.0.18 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (`/api/webauthn/prepare`) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled. ### Details **File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php`, lines 63-79 ```php #[Route(path: 'webauthn/prepare', name: 'api.private.webauthn.prepare', methods: ['POST'])] public function prepare(Request $request): JsonResponse { $data = json_decode($request->getContent(
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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