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Maven

GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g

ArcadeDB: Scripting authorization gate (GHSA-48qw) bypassed via SQL DEFINE FUNCTION ... LANGUAGE js

Published
Jul 16, 2026
Updated
Jul 16, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr hardening added a checkPermissionsOnDatabase(UPDATE_SECURITY) gate on the polyglot engine (PolyglotQueryEngine.java:112-114,126,176,199), but only there. The SQL route to JavaScript never touches it: DefineFunctionStatement.executeSimple (DefineFunctionStatement.java:37-100), LocalSchema.registerFunctionLibrary, and SQLQueryEngine library-function invocation (SQLQueryEngine.java:198-224) do no scripting-permission check.

Exploit: any user authorized for the DB (including a read-only role) runs POST /api/v1/command/<db> {"language":"sql","command":"DEFINE FUNCTION x.run "<js>" LANGUAGE js"} then SELECT x.run(), executing arbitrary JavaScript and defeating the control meant to restrict scripting to security admins. On this path allowedPackages is empty so Java.type host lookup and reflection are blocked, but IOAccess.ALL still permits load(url) SSRF/remote-JS inclusion and unbounded CPU/memory DoS.

Fix: gate DefineFunctionStatement.executeSimple, the SQLQueryEngine library-function wrapper (to also cover pre-existing libraries), and DeleteFunctionStatement with UPDATE_SECURITY for js/polyglot languages. Centralize as one assertCanExecuteUserCode(database) invoked by every code-execution surface. Also set IOAccess.NONE / PolyglotAccess.NONE on the Context (GraalPolyglotEngine.java:86,91).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavencom.arcadedb:arcadedb-engineall versions26.7.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine to 26.7.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

The GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr hardening added a checkPermissionsOnDatabase(UPDATE_SECURITY) gate on the polyglot engine (PolyglotQueryEngine.java:112-114,126,176,199), but only there. The SQL route to JavaScript never touches it: DefineFunctionStatement.executeSimple (DefineFunctionStatement.java:37-100), LocalSchema.registerFunctionLibrary, and SQLQueryEngine library-function invocation (SQLQueryEngine.java:198-224) do no scripting-permission check. Exploit: any user authorized for the DB (including a read-only role) runs POST /api/v1/command/<db> {"language":"sql","command":"DEFINE FUNCTION x.run
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vwjc-v7x7-cm6g across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.