Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go

GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93

chi Allows Host Header Injection which Leads to Open Redirect in RedirectSlashes

Also known asGO-2025-3770
Published
Jun 20, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/v5

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The RedirectSlashes function in middleware/strip.go is vulnerable to host header injection which leads to open redirect.

We consider this a lower-severity open redirect, as it can't be exploited from browsers or email clients (requires manipulation of a Host header).

Details

The RedirectSlashes method uses the Host header to construct the redirectURL at this line https://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/master/middleware/strip.go#L55

The Host header can be manipulated by a user to be any arbitrary host. This leads to open redirect when using the RedirectSlashes middleware

PoC

Create a simple server which uses the RedirectSlashes middleware

package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"net/http"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware" // Import the middleware package
)

func main() {
	// Create a new Chi router
	r := chi.NewRouter()

	// Use the built-in RedirectSlashes middleware
	r.Use(middleware.RedirectSlashes) // Use middleware.RedirectSlashes

	// Define a route handler
	r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// A simple response
		w.Write([]byte("Hello, World!"))
	})

	// Start the server
	fmt.Println("Starting server on :8080")
	http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}

Run the server go run main.go

Once the server is running, send a request that will trigger the RedirectSlashes function with an arbitrary Host header curl -iL -H "Host: example.com" http://localhost:8080/test/

Observe that the request will be redirected to example.com

curl -L -H "Host: example.com" http://localhost:8080/test/

<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
    <title>Example Domain</title>

    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <meta http-equiv="Content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
    <style type="text/css">
    body {
        background-color: #f0f0f2;
        margin: 0;
        padding: 0;
        font-family: -apple-system, system-ui, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", "Open Sans", "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;
... snipped ...

Without the host header, the response is returned from the test server

curl -L http://localhost:8080/test/

404 page not found

Impact

An open redirect vulnerability allows attackers to trick users into visiting malicious sites. This can lead to phishing attacks, credential theft, and malware distribution, as users trust the application’s domain while being redirected to harmful sites.

Potential mitigation

It seems that the purpose of the RedirectSlashes function is to redirect within the same application. In that case r.RequestURI can be used instead of r.Host by default. If there is a use case to redirect to a different host, a flag can be added to use the Host header instead. As this flag will be controlled by the developer they will make the decision of allowing redirects to arbitrary hosts based on their judgement.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5all versions5.2.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/go-chi/chi/v5. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 to 5.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The RedirectSlashes function in middleware/strip.go is vulnerable to host header injection which leads to open redirect. We consider this a **lower-severity** open redirect, as it can't be exploited from browsers or email clients (requires manipulation of a Host header). ### Details The RedirectSlashes method uses the Host header to construct the redirectURL at this line https://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/master/middleware/strip.go#L55 The Host header can be manipulated by a user to be any arbitrary host. This leads to open redirect when using the RedirectSlashes middleware ###
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.