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HIGH severity

Reading specially crafted serializable objects from an untrusted source may cause an infinite loop and denial of serviceGHSA-vr64-r9qj-h27f

HIGH

GHSA-vr64-r9qj-h27f is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in org.clojure:clojure. A fix is available for org.clojure:clojure — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-22871
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vr64-r9qj-h27f.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs75th percentile — riskier than 75% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.16%0.78%1.41%2.03%0.7%1.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕org.clojure:clojure☕org.clojure:clojure

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Any program on the JVM may read serialized objects via java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject(). Reading serialized objects from an untrusted source is inherently unsafe (this affects any program running on any version of the JVM) and is a prerequisite for this vulnerability.

Clojure classes that represent infinite seqs (Cycle, infinite Repeat, and Iterate) do not define hashCode() and use the parent ASeq.hashCode(), which walks the seq to compute the hash, yielding an infinite loop. Classes like java.util.HashMap call hashCode() on keys during deserialization of a serialized map.

The exploit requires:

  1. Crafting a serialized HashMap object with an infinite seq object as a key.
  2. Sending that to a program that reads serialized objects via ObjectInputStream.readObject().

This will cause the program to enter an infinite loop on the reading thread and thus a denial of service (DoS).

The affected Clojure classes (Cycle, Repeat, Iterate) exist in Clojure 1.7.0-1.11.1, 1.12.0-alpha1-1.12.0-alpha8.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenorg.clojure:clojure≥ 1.7.0&&< 1.11.21.11.2org.clojure:clojure:1.11.2
☕Mavenorg.clojure:clojure≥ 1.12.0-alpha1&&< 1.12.0-alpha91.12.0-alpha9org.clojure:clojure:1.12.0-alpha9

Affected Products

2 products · 12 configurations
Application
clojureclojure
≥ 1.2.0 && < 1.11.2
1 version
1.12.0
OS
fedorafedoraproject
3 versions
383940

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.clojure:clojure, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update org.clojure:clojure to 1.11.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vr64-r9qj-h27f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.

Frequently Asked Questions

Any program on the JVM may read serialized objects via [java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject()](https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/io/ObjectInputStream.html#readObject--). Reading serialized objects from an untrusted source is **inherently unsafe** (this affects any program running on any version of the JVM) and is a prerequisite for this vulnerability. Clojure classes that represent infinite seqs (Cycle, infinite Repeat, and Iterate) do not define hashCode() and use the parent ASeq.hashCode(), which walks the seq to compute the hash, yielding an infinite loop. Classes like java.u
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