Contrast's unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonationGHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8
HIGHGHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-285 vulnerability in github.com/edgelesssys/contrast. A fix is available for github.com/edgelesssys/contrast — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/edgelesssys/contrastReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either
- they
seta new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of thecontrastCLI) or - they
verifythe coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, the attacker can:
- Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA.
- Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.
This issue does not affect the following:
- secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)
- integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator
- certificates chaining back to the mesh CA
Patches
This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.
Workarounds
The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.
- At the first
setcall, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator. - After subsequent
setorverifycalls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/edgelesssys/contrast | all versions | 1.4.1go get github.com/edgelesssys/contrast@v1.4.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/edgelesssys/contrast, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/edgelesssys/contrast to 1.4.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.