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GHSA-vj64-rjf3-w3v7 — p3-challenger

GHSA-vj64-rjf3-w3v7 is a security vulnerability in p3-challenger. A fix is available for p3-challenger — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Plonky3 MultiField32Challenger: transcript malleability and challenge entropy loss

Also known asCVE-2026-46654
Published
May 21, 2026
Updated
Jun 11, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vj64-rjf3-w3v7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs2th percentile — riskier than 2% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🦀p3-challenger🦀p3-challenger

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

  • Key: challenger/src/multi_field_challenger.rs | MultiField32Challenger::duplexing | transcript_malleability

  • Affected files: challenger/src/multi_field_challenger.rs, field/src/helpers.rs

  • Violated invariant: The Fiat-Shamir sponge must bind challenges to the exact sequence of observed field elements. Specifically: (1) absorption must be injective — distinct observation streams must produce distinct sponge states, (2) squeezing must be injective — distinct PF rate cells must yield distinct F challenge sequences, and (3) all bits of each absorbed PF element must influence the sponge state.

  • Exploit scenario: An attacker controlling prover-side observations can craft distinct transcripts that produce identical challenges, breaking the binding property of Fiat-Shamir. Three independent attack vectors exist:

    1. Partial-chunk aliasing (absorb): duplexing() packs input_buffer.chunks(num_f_elms) via reduce_32 (base 2^32) with no length marker and no zeroing of unused rate slots. Observing [x] followed by a sample yields the same sponge state as [x, 0, ..., 0] (padded to num_f_elms) followed by a sample, since reduce_32 treats missing high limbs identically to explicit zeros. The attacker can extend or truncate the tail of any observation batch without changing future challenges.

    2. Non-injective squeeze (squeeze): split_32 decomposes each PF rate cell into base-2^64 digits and maps each through TF::from_u64, which reduces mod F::ORDER (~2^31). Two distinct PF values whose base-2^64 digits differ only in their upper 33 bits produce identical F challenge sequences. This weakens the entropy of sampled challenges and can enable selective forgery when the attacker can influence the sponge state pre-squeeze.

    3. High-bit truncation (observe Hash/MerkleCap): num_f_elms = PF::bits() / 64 computes the number of F limbs per PF element. For BN254 (254-bit field), this yields 3 limbs covering 192 bits — the top 62 bits of every digest word are silently discarded. An attacker can find two distinct BN254 hash digests that differ only in bits 192–253 and observe them interchangeably without affecting challenges.

  • Evidence: In duplexing(), the absorb path (reduce_32 with base 2^32) and the squeeze path (split_32 with base 2^64) use incompatible radices with no length domain separation. reduce_32 is a plain Horner fold acc * 2^32 + digit with no padding or tag, so trailing zeros are free. split_32 extracts u64 digits and casts each via TF::from_u64, which performs modular reduction, collapsing the top bits. The limb count PF::bits() / 64 is a floor division that silently drops all bits beyond 64 * num_f_elms for fields whose bit-width is not a multiple of 64.

Patches

Included in v0.4.3 and v0.5.3

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iop3-challengerall versions0.4.3cargo update -p p3-challenger --precise 0.4.3
🦀crates.iop3-challenger≥ 0.5.0&&< 0.5.30.5.3cargo update -p p3-challenger --precise 0.5.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for p3-challenger, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update p3-challenger to 0.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vj64-rjf3-w3v7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact - **Key**: `challenger/src/multi_field_challenger.rs` | `MultiField32Challenger::duplexing` | `transcript_malleability` - **Affected files**: `challenger/src/multi_field_challenger.rs`, `field/src/helpers.rs` - **Violated invariant**: The Fiat-Shamir sponge must bind challenges to the exact sequence of observed field elements. Specifically: (1) absorption must be injective — distinct observation streams must produce distinct sponge states, (2) squeezing must be injective — distinct PF rate cells must yield distinct F challenge sequences, and (3) all bits of each absorbed PF element
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-vj64-rjf3-w3v7: p3-challenger | O3 Security