How severe is GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p?

GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p affects the following packages: getgrav/grav (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p?

Update getgrav/grav to 2.0.0-beta.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for getgrav/grav. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p was published on May 5, 2026 and was last updated on May 5, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p

Grav has multiple RCE vectors: unsafe unserialize (x3), command injection in git clone, SSTI blocklist bypass

Published

May 5, 2026

Updated

May 5, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘getgrav/grav

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Multiple RCE vectors were found in Grav CMS. Three are critical, two are high.

1. Unsafe unserialize() in JobQueue — direct RCE gadget (Critical)

system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/JobQueue.php:465 calls unserialize(base64_decode(...)) without restricting allowed_classes. The Job class has call_user_func_array($this->command, $this->args) in its execution path, which is a direct gadget chain — inject a serialized Job with command = 'system' and args = ['whoami'].

The same codebase actually has a Serializable trait that correctly restricts classes, so this inconsistency stands out.

2. Unsafe unserialize() in FileCache — arbitrary class instantiation (Critical)

system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php:75 does unserialize($value, ['allowed_classes' => true]). That true allows instantiation of any class. If an attacker can write to the cache directory (via any file write primitive), they get object injection → RCE.

3. Unsafe unserialize() in Session (High)

system/src/Grav/Common/Session.php:116 — same allowed_classes => true pattern on session data. Lower severity since session storage is typically more restricted.

4. Command injection in git clone (Critical)

system/src/Grav/Console/Cli/InstallCommand.php:150 — only $this->destination uses escapeshellarg(). The $data['branch'], $data['url'], and $data['path'] variables go directly into the shell command without escaping. Admin-accessible via plugin/theme installation.

5. SSTI blocklist bypass (High)

system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php:267-286 — cleanDangerousTwig() blocks twig_array_map and twig_array_filter but not twig_array_reduce. Also missing file_get_contents and fwrite from the dangerous function blocklist. An attacker who can inject Twig templates can bypass the security filter.

All five are independently exploitable. The unserialize issues are the most concerning since they don't require admin access if there's any file write primitive.

— ProScan AppSec | proscan.one

Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)

Fixed in Grav core on the 2.0 branch: commit c66dfeb5f (items #1, #2, #3, #4) and commit 38685ac25 + c66dfeb5f (item #5) — ships in 2.0.0-beta.2.

All five vectors addressed:

Scheduler\JobQueue unsafe unserialize — serialized_job now carries a sibling serialized_job_hmac signed with Security::getNonceKey(). reconstructJob refuses to unserialize an item whose HMAC is missing/mismatched and falls through to the safe structured-fields rebuild. A tampered queue file can no longer smuggle a forged Job for direct RCE via Job::exec → call_user_func_array.
→ system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/JobQueue.php
FileCache unsafe unserialize — same HMAC-integrity approach; see separate GHSA-gwfr-jfjf-92vv.
→ system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php
Session::getFlashObject unsafe unserialize — payload now wrapped in a v2|<hmac>|<serialized> envelope; legacy/forged envelopes return null instead of triggering unserialize.
→ system/src/Grav/Common/Session.php
InstallCommand git clone shell injection — branch, url, and path values read from user/.dependencies are now passed through escapeshellarg, with a -- separator before url/path to block option-injection (e.g. --upload-pack=evil).
→ system/src/Grav/Console/Cli/InstallCommand.php
SSTI blocklist bypass — twig_array_reduce (the specific name called out) plus twig_array_some and twig_array_every added to cleanDangerousTwig's CALLABLE_DANGEROUS_NAMES alongside the existing twig_array_map/filter. More importantly, the new Twig content sandbox in 2.0.0-beta.2 blocks this class of attack at a different layer — see the sandbox work in 38685ac25.
→ system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php

Tests:

tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/UnserializeIntegritySecurityTest.php — 8 cases covering JobQueue + Session HMAC integrity.
tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/FileCacheSecurityTest.php.
tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/CleanDangerousTwigTest.php — new twig_array_* entries in providerCallbackFunctions.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`getgrav/grav`	all versions	2.0.0-beta.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for getgrav/grav. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update getgrav/grav to 2.0.0-beta.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Multiple RCE vectors were found in Grav CMS. Three are critical, two are high. **1. Unsafe unserialize() in JobQueue — direct RCE gadget (Critical)** `system/src/Grav/Common/Scheduler/JobQueue.php:465` calls `unserialize(base64_decode(...))` without restricting `allowed_classes`. The `Job` class has `call_user_func_array($this->command, $this->args)` in its execution path, which is a direct gadget chain — inject a serialized `Job` with `command = 'system'` and `args = ['whoami']`. The same codebase actually has a `Serializable` trait that correctly restricts classes, so this inconsistency s

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vj3m-2g9h-vm4p across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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