GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg
Taylor has race condition in /get-patch that allows purchase token replay
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
taylorednpmDescription
Hi team,
I was looking at the recent fix and you limited the exploitability of race conditions but unfortunately it is still possible to exploit the issue since two requests happening at the exact same time will still go through. You should be able to completely fix the race conditions by leveraging SQLITE write lock and just send one query.
Summary
The /get-patch endpoint processes a purchase in two separate database queries: a SELECT that verifies the token is unused, followed by an UPDATE that marks the token as used. Because SQLite only guards each statement, a malicious actor can issue two requests at the exact same moment and have both SELECT statements succeed before either UPDATE runs.
Details
The handler executes (step 1):
SELECT id, token_used_at FROM purchases WHERE patch_id = ? AND purchase_token = ? AND status = 'COMPLETED'
If token_used_at IS NULL, the request passes the check (step 2):
if (row.token_used_at) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "Purchase token has already been used." });
}
The handler finally runs (step 3):
UPDATE purchases SET token_used_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?
When two requests arrive at the same time, they both finish step 1 while the row is still unused. SQLite serializes writers only per statement, so each request believes it has exclusive access. Both decrypt and return the patch, and both UPDATE statements succeed.
PoC
To perform this attack, you need to send two requests at the exact same time.
Impact
An attacker who possesses a valid purchase token can replay it and receive multiple copies of the paid patch, or distribute one copy while still keeping their own. This results in revenue loss and undermines license enforcement.
Remediation
Replace the read-then-write sequence with a single atomic statement that both validates and consumes the token while SQLite holds the write lock:
const row = db.prepare(`
UPDATE purchases
SET token_used_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE patch_id = ?
AND purchase_token = ?
AND status = 'COMPLETED'
AND token_used_at IS NULL
RETURNING id;
`).get(patchId, token);
if (!row) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Invalid or already-used token.' });
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | taylored | all versions | 8.1.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for taylored. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update taylored to 8.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwg across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.