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HIGH severity

GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq

HIGHFix: labstack/echo#3009

GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/labstack/echo/v5. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files

Also known asCVE-2026-55677
Published
Aug 25, 2026
Updated
Aug 25, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
2 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/labstack/echo/v5🐹github.com/labstack/echo/v4🐹github.com/labstack/echo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.

Details

Root cause 1 — router.go lines 798-802: The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.

if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
    path = req.URL.RawPath
}

Root cause 2 — echo.go lines 559-568: StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.

if !disablePathUnescaping {
    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
    p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))

PoC (Screenshot)

Sample: <img width="1291" height="970" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bc58059-3e6d-4678-ab25-a5c79b006738" />

403: <img width="526" height="194" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f55ffdd-87b2-4a1b-8a13-130ebad0f257" />

Bypass with encoded slash: <img width="592" height="203" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1191cd39-ae8f-4d7e-8fb1-cb9cf31f484f" />

Impact

Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/%2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.

Common affected pattern:

adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))

Affected Packages

3 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/labstack/echo/v5all versions5.2.0
🐹Gogithub.com/labstack/echo/v4all versions4.15.3
🐹Gogithub.com/labstack/echoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/labstack/echo/v5. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/labstack/echo/v5 to 5.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization. ### Details **Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:** The router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and d
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq: v5 (High 7.5) | O3 Security