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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3

openssl-encrypt has non-cryptographic PRNG used for steganography pixel selection

Published
Mar 31, 2026
Updated
Mar 31, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍openssl-encrypt

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Description

Summary

The generate_pseudorandom_sequence() function in openssl_encrypt/plugins/steganography/core/utils.py at lines 89-91 uses Python's random module (Mersenne Twister) for steganographic pixel/sample selection.

Affected Code

random.seed(seed)
sequence = random.sample(range(max_value), min(length, max_value))
return sequence

Additionally, the steganography password is stored as a plain Python string (not SecureBytes) and only 8 bytes (64 bits) of the SHA-256 hash are used for the seed, reducing effective security to 64 bits.

Impact

The Mersenne Twister's state can be recovered from approximately 624 outputs. An attacker who knows or guesses the password can predict the PRNG sequence and determine exactly which pixels contain hidden data, potentially extracting the hidden data without the password.

Recommended Fix

  • Use HMAC-DRBG or secrets module for cryptographically secure pixel selection
  • Use full 32-byte SHA-256 output as seed material
  • Store the password in SecureBytes instead of a plain string

Fix

Fixed in commit 09e96e0 on branch releases/1.4.x — replaced random.seed(hash(password)) with HMAC-SHA256 based CSPRNG (Fisher-Yates shuffle) and numpy Generator with HMAC-derived seeds across all steganography format modules.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenssl-encryptall versions1.4.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openssl-encrypt. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openssl-encrypt to 1.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `generate_pseudorandom_sequence()` function in `openssl_encrypt/plugins/steganography/core/utils.py` at **lines 89-91** uses Python's `random` module (Mersenne Twister) for steganographic pixel/sample selection. ### Affected Code ```python random.seed(seed) sequence = random.sample(range(max_value), min(length, max_value)) return sequence ``` Additionally, the steganography password is stored as a plain Python string (not `SecureBytes`) and only 8 bytes (64 bits) of the SHA-256 hash are used for the seed, reducing effective security to 64 bits. ### Impact The Mersenne Twi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-vfgx-5q85-58q3 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.