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parse-server: Stored XSS via non-standard file extension bypassing file upload extension blocklistGHSA-v8x7-r927-cc93

Fix: parse-community/parse-server#10505

GHSA-v8x7-r927-cc93 is a Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability in parse-server. A fix is available for parse-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asBIT-parse-2026-55778CVE-2026-55778
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v8x7-r927-cc93.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs46th percentile — riskier than 46% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.05%0.4%0.6%0.6%0.6%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

62other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
parse-servernpm
39Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Parse Server's default fileUpload.fileExtensions blocklist is intended to prevent uploading files that browsers render as active content (such as HTML and SVG), which can be used to perform stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against other users. The blocklist could be bypassed by uploading a file whose extension is not an exact match of a blocked extension (for example a non-standard or compound extension) together with a dangerous content type. On storage adapters that persist and serve the uploaded content type (such as S3 and GCS), the file is then served with the attacker-supplied content type, enabling stored XSS against users who open the file URL.

This affects the default configuration, in which authenticated users are allowed to upload files. The default GridFS/filesystem adapter sets the X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff response header, which mitigates browser rendering on that adapter, but the upload restriction itself is still bypassed. This is an incomplete-fix follow-up of GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc and GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v.

Patches

The file upload extension validation now also evaluates the request content type against the configured blocklist whenever the filename's extension is not a recognized type. As a result, a dangerous content type can no longer be preserved by uploading a file with a non-standard extension, and such uploads are rejected.

Workarounds

Configure fileUpload.fileExtensions as a strict allowlist of only the file extensions your application needs (for example ["^(png|jpe?g|gif|pdf)$"]) instead of relying on the default blocklist. Additionally, serve uploaded files from a separate domain than the application, so that any executed content is isolated from the application's origin.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmparse-server≥ 9.0.0&&< 9.9.1-alpha.119.9.1-alpha.11npm install parse-server@9.9.1-alpha.11
📦npmparse-serverall versions8.6.81npm install parse-server@8.6.81

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for parse-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update parse-server to 9.9.1-alpha.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v8x7-r927-cc93 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Parse Server's default `fileUpload.fileExtensions` blocklist is intended to prevent uploading files that browsers render as active content (such as HTML and SVG), which can be used to perform stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against other users. The blocklist could be bypassed by uploading a file whose extension is not an exact match of a blocked extension (for example a non-standard or compound extension) together with a dangerous content type. On storage adapters that persist and serve the uploaded content type (such as S3 and GCS), the file is then served with the attac
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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