How severe is GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm?

GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm affects the following packages: ckb (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm?

Update ckb to 0.40.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ckb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Is GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm?

GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 1.2%, placing it in the 67th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

When was GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm was published on August 25, 2021 and was last updated on November 8, 2023. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

Not in CISA KEV

Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyedGHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm

GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm is a security vulnerability in ckb. A fix is available for ckb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2021-45698 GHSA-8gjm-h3xj-mp6wRUSTSEC-2021-0107

Published

Aug 25, 2021

Updated

Nov 8, 2023

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

1.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs67th percentile — riskier than 67% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🦀ckb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The RPC get_block_template fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions.

Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B.

The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC get_block_template will fail instead of dropping A.

Patch

First, the get_block_template should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions.

Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain.

Workaround

Submit transaction B when A is already on chain.
Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions:
- a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B.
- b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction.
Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`ckb`	all versions	0.40.0`cargo update -p ckb --precise 0.40.0`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

ckbnervos

< 0.40.0

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ckb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update ckb to 0.40.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The RPC `get_block_template` fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC `get_block_template` will fail instead of dropping A. ### Patch First, the `get_block_template` should not fail but dropping the conflict transact

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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