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HIGH severity

Daptin: SQL injection via unvalidated goqu.L() calls in aggregate APIGHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv

HIGH

GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) SQL Injection vulnerability in github.com/daptin/daptin. A fix is available for github.com/daptin/daptin — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-41422GO-2026-5640
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs28th percentile — riskier than 28% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.65%0.98%0.0%0.3%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/daptin/daptin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The /aggregate/:typename endpoint accepted column and group query parameters that were passed verbatim to goqu.L() — a raw SQL literal expression builder — without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.

Impact

An authenticated low-privilege user could:

  • Extract data from any table via subquery: (SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak
  • Disclose database internals: sqlite_version(), (SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)
  • Exfiltrate cross-table data via correlated subqueries

The vulnerability was confirmed locally; user_account.email values were extracted via a crafted column parameter by a non-admin user.

Root Cause

goqu.L(userInput) in server/resource/resource_aggregate.go inserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.

Fix (v0.11.4)

All goqu.L() calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with:

  • Structural expression parsing supporting all documented API forms
  • Schema-based column validation (column names checked against entity schema via TableInfo().GetColumnByName())
  • Exact-match allowlist for aggregate functions (count, sum, avg, min, max, first, last) and scalar functions (date, strftime, upper, lower, etc.)
  • Safe goqu constructors (goqu.I(), goqu.SUM(), goqu.Func()) for all generated expressions
  • allowedTables scope enforcement: qualified column refs (table.col) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables only

Two additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit: uuid.MustParse panic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic in ToOrderedExpressionArray on empty sort expressions.

Credits

Reported by @VashuVats.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/daptin/daptinall versions0.11.4go get github.com/daptin/daptin@v0.11.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/daptin/daptin, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/daptin/daptin to 0.11.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `/aggregate/:typename` endpoint accepted `column` and `group` query parameters that were passed verbatim to `goqu.L()` — a raw SQL literal expression builder — without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions. ## Impact An authenticated low-privilege user could: - Extract data from any table via subquery: `(SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak` - Disclose database internals: `sqlite_version()`, `(SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)` - Exfiltrate cross-table data vi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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