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GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p

oneshot has potential Use After Free when used asynchronously

Also known asRUSTSEC-2026-0005
Published
Jan 27, 2026
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀oneshot

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

There is a race condition that can lead to a use-after-free if a oneshot::Receiver is polled but then dropped instead of polled to completion. This could happen if the receiver future was cancelled while receiving, for example by being wrapped in a timeout future or similar.

When the Receiver is polled (Future::poll) it writes a waker to the channel and sets it to the RECEIVING state. If the Receiver was then dropped (instead of polled to completion), the Drop implementation on Receiver unconditionally swapped the channel state to DISCONNECTED and only after doing so it read back its waker from the heap allocation and dropped it. The problem is that the DISCONNECTED state could be observed by the Sender, which would lead to it deallocating the channel heap memory. If the Sender manage to free the channel before the Receiver managed to proceed to dropping the waker, then the Receiver would read from the freed channel memory (Use After Free).

The fix was submitted in https://github.com/faern/oneshot/pull/74 and published as part of oneshot version 0.1.12.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iooneshotall versions0.1.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneshot. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update oneshot to 0.1.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

There is a race condition that can lead to a use-after-free if a `oneshot::Receiver` is polled but then dropped instead of polled to completion. This could happen if the receiver future was cancelled while receiving, for example by being wrapped in a timeout future or similar. When the `Receiver` is polled (`Future::poll`) it writes a waker to the channel and sets it to the `RECEIVING` state. If the `Receiver` was then dropped (instead of polled to completion), the `Drop` implementation on `Receiver` unconditionally swapped the channel state to `DISCONNECTED` and only after doing so it read b
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rvr2-r3pv-5m4p across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.