GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 — powsybl-commons
Fix: powsybl/powsybl-core@72f79deGHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 is a security vulnerability in com.powsybl:powsybl-commons. A fix is available for com.powsybl:powsybl-commons — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PowSyBl Core contains Polynomial REDoS’es
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
com.powsybl:powsybl-commonsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is an advisory for a potential polynomial Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the PowSyBl's DataSource mechanism. When the listNames(String regex) method is called on a DataSource, the user-supplied regular expression (which may be unvalidated) is compiled and evaluated against a collection of file-like resource names.
To trigger a polynomial ReDoS via this mechanism, two attacker-controlled conditions must be met:
- Control over the regex input passed into
listNames(String regex).- Example: An attacker supplies a malicious pattern like
(.*a){10000}.
- Example: An attacker supplies a malicious pattern like
- Control or influence over the file/resource names being matched.
- Example: Filenames such as
"aaaa...!"that induce regex engine backtracking.
- Example: Filenames such as
If both conditions are satisfied, a malicious actor can cause significant CPU consumption due to regex backtracking — even
with polynomial patterns. Since both inputs can be controlled via a publicly accessible method or external filesystem handling,
the listNames(String regex) method is considered vulnerable to polynomial REDoS.
Unlike classic catastrophic exponential ReDoS, this subtle attack exploits a greedy .* prefix followed by a fixed suffix, repeated multiple times.
When applied to long filenames that almost match the pattern, the regex engine performs extensive backtracking, degrading performance predictably with input size. In a multi-tenant environment, an attacker can degrade the performance - and thereby the availability - of the server to an extent that it affects other users of the application. This can for example be useful if an attacker wants to delay other users in a scenario where a time advantage can be a competitive advantage.
A tricky part in this is that the attacker needs to control both the pattern and the input which may not always be the case.
Am I impacted?
You are vulnerable if you make direct calls to the listNames(String regex) method on a class implementing the ReadOnlyDataSource interface, don't control the regular expression used as regex parameter, and if this datasource points to an archive or directory where an untrusted user may edit the filenames.
For instance, this could be the case if you want to list the files made available by a datasource which names respect a user-provided regular expression.
Note that only direct calls to this method are concerned. There are several usages of this method in powsybl, but the provided regular expressions are all hardcoded and therefore cannot be provided by a malicious user.
Patches
com.powsybl:powsybl-commons:6.7.2 and higher
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | com.powsybl:powsybl-commons | all versions | 6.7.2com.powsybl:powsybl-commons:6.7.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.powsybl:powsybl-commons, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update com.powsybl:powsybl-commons to 6.7.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-rqpx-f6rc-7hm5 across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.