GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g
MEDIUMOpen WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
POST /api/v1/images/edit performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the /api/v1/images/generations route, the built-in edit_image tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator's credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.
Impact
An authenticated, non-admin user can:
- bypass the global
ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=Falseadministrator control; - bypass a denied per-user/group
features.image_generationpermission; - cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (
IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEYfor the OpenAI engine).
No cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.
Affected Versions
>= 0.8.11, < 0.10.0 (the /api/v1/images/edit route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in v0.10.0.
Details
/api/v1/images/generations enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION (403 if globally disabled) and features.image_generation (403 for non-admins without the permission). The edit_image built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and features.image_generation. The direct POST /api/v1/images/edit route ran on Depends(get_verified_user) alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.
Proof of Concept
As a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or features.image_generation denied for the user:
POST /api/v1/images/edit
Authorization: Bearer <non_admin_user_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"image":"data:image/png;base64,<png>","prompt":"edit","model":"gpt-image-1"}
The request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.
Patch
The direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring generate_images/image_generations): a thin /edit route now enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and the per-user features.image_generation permission before delegating to the shared image_edits() implementation. The internal callers (the edit_image tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | ≥ 0.8.11&&< 0.10.0 | 0.10.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.10.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.