NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Backstage has a Possible Symlink Path Traversal in Scaffolder ActionsGHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp

HIGHFix: backstage/backstage@c641c14

GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in @backstage/backend-defaults. A fix is available for @backstage/backend-defaults — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-24046
Published
Updated
Affected
8 pkgs
Patched
8 / 8
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs45th percentile — riskier than 45% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.69%1.03%0.0%0.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

8 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

256other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@backstage/backend-defaultsnpm
411Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Multiple Scaffolder actions and archive extraction utilities were vulnerable to symlink-based path traversal attacks. An attacker with access to create and execute Scaffolder templates could exploit symlinks to:

  1. Read arbitrary files via the debug:log action by creating a symlink pointing to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, configuration files, secrets)
  2. Delete arbitrary files via the fs:delete action by creating symlinks pointing outside the workspace
  3. Write files outside the workspace via archive extraction (tar/zip) containing malicious symlinks

This affects any Backstage deployment where users can create or execute Scaffolder templates.

Patches

This vulnerability is fixed in the following package versions:

  • @backstage/backend-defaults version 0.12.2, 0.13.2, 0.14.1, 0.15.0
  • @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend version 2.2.2, 3.0.2, 3.1.1
  • @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node version 0.11.2, 0.12.3

Users should upgrade to these versions or later.

Workarounds

  • Follow the recommendation in the Backstage Threat Model to limit access to creating and updating templates
  • Restrict who can create and execute Scaffolder templates using the permissions framework
  • Audit existing templates for symlink usage
  • Run Backstage in a containerized environment with limited filesystem access

References

Affected Packages

8 total 8 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@backstage/backend-defaultsall versions0.12.2npm install @backstage/backend-defaults@0.12.2
📦npm@backstage/backend-defaults≥ 0.13.0&&< 0.13.20.13.2npm install @backstage/backend-defaults@0.13.2
📦npm@backstage/backend-defaults≥ 0.14.0&&< 0.14.10.14.1npm install @backstage/backend-defaults@0.14.1
📦npm@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backendall versions2.2.2npm install @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend@2.2.2
📦npm@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.0.23.0.2npm install @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend@3.0.2
📦npm@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend≥ 3.1.0&&< 3.1.13.1.1npm install @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend@3.1.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @backstage/backend-defaults, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @backstage/backend-defaults to 0.12.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

To exploit this issue, an attacker needs to have access to create and execute Scaffolder actions, specifically the debug:log, fs:delete actions and archive extractions, limiting the exposure of this flaw. Additionally, file systems operations are constrained by the permissions of the process, limiting the impact to…

Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, consider implementing strict access controls for Backstage Scaffolder templates. Restrict the ability to create and execute Scaffolder templates to trusted users only, utilizing the Backstage permissions framework. Additionally, audit existing templates for any symlink usage and consider running Backstage within a containerized environment with a highly restricted filesystem to limit potential impact.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Developer Hub 1.8rhdh/rhdh-hub-rhel9:1774545605RHSA-2026:6174
Red Hat Developer Hub 1.9rhdh/rhdh-hub-rhel9:1775140647RHSA-2026:6802

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Multiple Scaffolder actions and archive extraction utilities were vulnerable to symlink-based path traversal attacks. An attacker with access to create and execute Scaffolder templates could exploit symlinks to: 1. **Read arbitrary files** via the `debug:log` action by creating a symlink pointing to sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, configuration files, secrets) 2. **Delete arbitrary files** via the `fs:delete` action by creating symlinks pointing outside the workspace 3. **Write files outside the workspace** via archive extraction (tar/zip) containing malicious symlinks This
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rq6q-wr2q-7pgp in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

Backstage has a Possible Symlink Path Traversal in…